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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I explore the role of perceptual agency in the compositional 
process of four recent pieces. Perceptual agency is examined through the 
mechanism of the “frame” – a way of constricting or shaping the total field of 
possibility in ways that inform the perceptual ordering of the contents of that 
frame, altering their intentionality. This is seen to operate on multiple levels. 
Firstly with respect to the act of composition itself, which proceeds through a 
series of incremental stages, the aggregate result of prior stages informing the 
field of possibilities for – providing the frame through which to approach – 
each subsequent stage. In this way, the act of composition becomes a 
perceptual one in which arrays of possible intentionalities are gradually 
excavated. Secondly with respect to the choice of instrumental materials 
themselves, invariably chosen for their primarily modulatory capacity; that is, 
their ability to frame and be framed by their own context. The score, then, is 
an archaeological trace of the sedimentation of these layered processes, 
presenting (while not defining) a wide array of potential patterns of framing 
requiring processing and synthesis. The nature of the score engages the 
performer’s own perceptual agency through the learning process, analogous 
to the compositional process itself, as it is necessarily comprised of 
subsequent layers of framing. 
The thesis commences with a general exploration of perceptual agency, 
frames and intentionality against a backdrop of phenomenological and 
ecological writing. Having essayed the conceptual territory surrounding these 
core terms, there follows a detailed discussion of the compositional processes 
and priorities employed in the pieces contained with this thesis, focusing on 
the three pieces composed in 2011, and the manner in which the multi-layered 
approach to composition continually reframes and responds to its own 
results. Particular emphasis is placed on the treatment of the temporal 
domain, as this represents the most significant compositional and theoretical 
departure from common notational practice. The final part of the thesis 
examines the ways in which perceptual agency is engaged on the part of the 
performer, and concludes with a brief consideration of possible future 
avenues of exploration.
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FRAMING INTENTION: PERCEPTUAL AGENCY IN THE 
COMPOSITIONAL PROCESS OF RECENT PIECES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of the years 2010-11, substantial changes have taken place in 
the way I conceive of musical practice, the act of composition in particular. 
Foremost among these has been a shift towards the consideration and active 
engagement of perceptual agency on compositional, performative and 
auditive levels. 
The term “perceptual agency” in the context of this thesis is necessarily 
defined as loosely as possible. I understand it to indicate an active harnessing 
of our capacity as perceptive (rather than simply receptive) organisms. It implies 
the formation of musical “meaning” through a constructive process resulting 
from engaged perception, rather than the (more or less adequate) 
recuperation of externally defined meaning. There is a substantial body of art 
in all media that addresses the perceptual agency of the audience and, to a 
slightly lesser extent, the agency of the interpreter in response to the text. The 
challenge my work has increasingly been responding to is that of embedding 
such perceptual agency within the compositional process itself. 
This has largely been achieved through the use of what I am referring to as 
the “frame”, a term drawn from the writings of Peter Ablinger (2007). 
“Frame”, here, relates to the manner in which the signification of any 
perceived phenomenon is dependant on (or at the very least informed by) the 
context surrounding it, and the possibility of, through consciously 
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manipulating that context (the frame), altering that meaning. Or, conversely, 
that the frame can imply a “demand to signify” upon information that is not 
yet significatory (for example, a collection of abstract numbers). The 
phenomenon achieves signification through the act of being framed and 
examined. 
The notion of the frame always comprises an interaction between data and 
context, but the precise nature of either of these components is highly 
variable. “Context” here may be social or circumstantial (for instance, the 
assumption that performer-produced sound in the context of a concert setting 
is “music”; or the culturally-dependant perception of the interval of a major 
third as “consonant”); or it may be more specifically musically local (for 
instance, the “function” of a given musical element or object being framed by 
the surrounding musical context, such as pitch function in a tonal context). In 
fact, the single prerequisite for the construction of a frame as I am employing 
the term is the quality of perceptual expectation: it is constituted through either 
the active demand or passive assumption that the data viewed through the 
frame furnish the perceiver with certain types of information and behaviour. 
Perceptual agency is engaged through the use of such frames at each level of 
musical process: during the act of composition, each new layer of process 
forms a gradually refining frame, shaping future decisions while refusing to 
concretely dictate the morphology of anything; during the process of 
performance, the interaction of notational elements is mutually framing, 
limiting the field of possibilities implied by any given notational constellation 
while never defining the precise sonic outcome; and at the stage of audition, 
frames suggested by both local context and performance situation suggest 
qualities of intentionality and modes of listening. More detail on the precise 
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manners in which frames have been engaged in the compositional process are 
detailed in Chapter Two. 
I see my role as composer as two-fold, the first being to engineer 
circumstances in which it becomes possible to access human agency of the 
sorts described above at the compositional, interpretive and auditive stages; 
the second being the seemingly more mundane activity of producing a score. 
This view places the majority of emphasis on the production of a score-based 
trace, a document that can be employed as the basis from which the 
realisation of a performance becomes possible. It also implies a certain quality 
of responsibility to the interpretive and auditive stages of the music-making 
process in terms of how that score creates contexts in which agency plays a 
necessary and foregrounded role. 
The relocation of focus in my work towards human agency has implications 
on approaches to intentionality: essentially that the intentionality underlying 
musical materials is something that should be “discovered” (either actively or 
passively) rather than something “communicated”. Some composers (Antoine 
Beuger, Peter Ablinger) access this uncovering of intentionality through a 
minimalism of means. In Beuger’s case, a limitation of material – a refusal to 
provide corroborating “evidence” for what the function of any given element 
might be. In Ablinger’s, the limitation of the terms of any given piece of music 
places extreme perceptual focus on the shifting relationships between them. 
Other composers (such as Evan Johnson and Aaron Cassidy) access this 
through a paralysing superfluity of information, in which the performer must 
negotiate a dense forest of potential meaning. 
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Such strategies are united in their engagement with the concept of 
intentionality, understood as a loosely defined “meaning” or “function” 
attached to musical phenomena within a given piece. Broadly speaking, this 
engagement reflects a shift in the location of this intentionality from the 
composer (i.e. regarding musical phenomena as being fundamentally 
transmissive of a composer-defined “meaning”) towards that of performer 
and/or listener (i.e. regarding musical intentionality as something 
constructed at the point of reception). 
In terms of my own compositional practice, the approach to this constellation 
of issues is most evident in my increasing use of the technical resources of an 
instrument purely for their modulatory qualities, rather than their expressive 
potency in their own right (i.e. elements that take on meaning only insofar as 
they are combined with other elements), and my treatment of the score as the 
resultant sedimentation of the processes that have lead to its creation. 
While, due to the sometimes extreme density of information on the page, my 
notational practices are frequently regarded as belonging to a modernist or 
“new complexity” tradition, it is primarily my encounters with composers 
belonging to perhaps more “experimental” traditions that have materially 
shaped my attitudes to musical practice over the past several years. Foremost 
among them the composers belonging to the Wandelweiser collective 
(particularly Antoine Beuger, Michael Pisaro, Manfred Werder, Burkhard 
Schlothauer), Peter Ablinger, James Saunders, Christian Wolff and John Cage, 
but also the problematised experience of large-scale structure in the late 
works of Morton Feldman and certain works of Bryn Harrison. The work of 
composers more readily associated with “complexist” ideals, such as Brian 
Ferneyhough, Richard Barrett, Aaron Cassidy and Evan Johnson have also 
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left indelible marks on my work, but in general I would note that it is the 
more experimental aspects of their work that has been stimulatory: 
Ferneyhough’s accessing of creative compositional and interpretive impulse 
through the preponderance of points of resistance; Barrett’s “poly-work” 
pieces, which achieve a charged formal ambiguity; Cassidy’s reimagining of 
the relationships between choreography and sound; and Johnson’s 
incorporation of superfluity and waste. The solo and small-ensemble works 
by Liza Lim, in which sound frequently inhabits transitional spaces, seeming 
to oscillate between potential identities have also been of significant influence. 
My work is also deeply inspired by, indebted to, and exists frequently in 
response to, the compositional work of friends and colleagues too numerous 
to mention, but foremost among them being Benjamin Isaacs, Charlie Sdraulig 
and Timothy McCormack. 
The philosophies of Deleuze (particularly), Derrida and Foucault are very 
important to me, although it is difficult for me to say whether my own 
thought has developed in response to their writings, or whether they simply 
espoused with a sort of incendiary clarity a view of the world that resonated 
strongly with my own consciously or unconsciously held attitudes. The same 
is true of phenomenological writings such as those by Edmund Husserl and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which have informed my understanding of the 
object-making qualities of perception, as well as the more music-focussed 
writing of David Clarke. I have also done substantial research into 
connectionist models of musical perception, still a fairly young field of 
investigation, in which the way our mind entrains to musical stimuli is 
explored, as well as ecological approaches to music perception such as Eric 
Clarke’s. 
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Beyond this, I find frequent inspiration in the work of other artists. In the 
visual arts, the works of Gerhard Richter and Agnes Martin resonate 
particularly strongly with me. The poets Simon Howard and Ulf Stolterfoht, 
whose work constantly circles grammatical and significatory sense, while 
always staunchly avoiding it, has been pivotal in clarifying the qualities of 
“perhaps-ness” that I wish to imbue the human-trace relationships with in my 
own work. Similarly the novelists Alain Robbe-Grillet and his replacement of 
narrative with a primarily visual surface, and Mark Z. Danielewski, whose 
House of leaves replaces narrative with – as improbable as this sounds – a series 
of literary surfaces. 
This thesis commences with a general consideration of the qualities of 
perceptual agency, framing and intentionality. This discussion is primarily 
focussed not on the concrete realisation of those concepts in my compositional 
work, but rather on the broader aesthetic background which informs it 
(discussions of these aspects specifically in relation to my own work are 
concentrated in Chapters Two and Three). That said, the chapter does provide 
a general overview of the sorts of priorities of interaction with sensory data 
with which the compositional work (both in terms of generating the piece, 
and in terms of structuring future interactions from performers and listeners) 
engages, and is a necessary background for the more technical discussions 
that follow. 
Chapter Two provides a description of typical strategies employed in the 
compositional processes resulting in the pieces included in the portfolio of 
compositions. The nature of individual response to local circumstances 
during the composition of any given piece renders this somewhat of a fiction 
(the analytical replication of the precise method of composition of any of the 
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pieces included with this submission is literally impossible), but it provides a 
workable overview of the sorts of decisions being made, and the sorts of 
result that these decisions seek to privilege. 
This is supplemented by a consideration of the interaction between the 
performer and the score, with a focus on the sorts of decisions a performer is 
required to make, and the bases on which these decisions might be made, as 
well as some comments on situations that actively preclude the types of 
performer agency that the score is attempting to instigate. The discussion will 
draw on my own experiences of working with performers one-on-one to 
realise interpretations on the pieces included with this submission. 
The final chapter contains a brief, and somewhat more reflective, description 
of each of the pieces included in the portfolio, tracing the development of my 
practice and preoccupations throughout the course of this degree, as they 
increasingly reflect the concerns under discussion in this thesis. 
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1. PERCEPTUAL AGENCY: FRAMES AND INTENTIONALITY 
There is a book by Luigi Serafini called the Codex Seraphinianus (Serafini 1981), 
in which an invented language is employed, along with illustrations of 
bizarre flora and fauna (and frequently hybrids of both). The book appears to 
take the form of a sort of encyclopaedia cataloguing the social, botanical, 
anthropological and architectural details and histories of an alien land. The 
degree to which Serafini’s language contains translatable sense, meaning and 
grammar is unclear, and it may be considered (however provisionally and 
inconclusively) to be asemic. The book’s original publisher – Franco Maria 
Ricci – states in his introduction to the first edition (the only text not in the 
strange, “Serafinian” language):  
After finding shelter and attending to his vital needs of nourishment and pillage, a 
Hun, a barbarian ignorant of the alphabet, makes his way to the library where he 
leafs with astonishment through an illuminated codex. I would like that the reader 
turns the pages of the Codex Seraphinianus like this warrior, or even like a child who 
doesn’t yet know how to read, captivated by the visions that the images inspire 
within him. (quoted in Hurder [n.d.]) 
The sensation Ricci describes here, the feeling of the not-yet-literate child is a 
mystification in the face of an unknown signification, coupled with awareness 
that this is a system of signs that conveys meaning and significance to those 
who can read it. Hurder describes the book’s composition as confounding 
Wolfgang Iser’s reader response theory (Iser 2000) through its refusal to work 
with the reader to build meaning: 
As comprehensible as it is as an encyclopedia, it is still presented to the reader 
encyclopedically; namely, as a finished product without an inroad to begin the work 
required to construct its meaning. Moreover, in being indecipherable, the Codex 
essentially tells the reader that it doesn’t care if it is understood or not. As a result, it 
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stonewalls the collaborative process that Iser writes about; if the reader is to form any 
understanding of it, it must be exclusively on the reader’s terms. Ricci’s notion of 
“taking it all in” is flipped; the Codex entices the reader to understand it, but the 
reader is on his or her own in this process. (Hurder [n.d.]) 
The reader being “on their own” is, however, no insignificant thing. There is 
already, in the person of the reader, a significant body of literary experience: 
the reader’s prior engagement with the written word in various forms allows 
them to presume that the text is encyclopaedic in nature, the combination 
with pictures allows the reader to begin to posit the subject matter. Indeed, 
the fact that it is a published text, distributed in the form of printed and 
bound pages, already suggests things about the purpose of the document. The 
Codex Seraphinianus eschews a situation in which the primary feature, or 
requirement, of the reader is an understanding of language, in favour of a 
situation in which the primary feature is the reader’s own individual 
experience with the act of reading itself. Hurder goes on to suggest that “the 
Codex demands a new method of experiencing the text – one that focuses on 
the pleasure of the almost-known, rather than getting hung up on simply 
knowing.” 
The experience of engaging with the Codex Seraphinianus as reader, and the 
nature of the relationships this implies between author and reader, offers a 
cogent analogy to many of the priorities of my own compositional work. This 
first chapter explores the aesthetic background to my work – the questions 
that interest me, and with which my work engages. It does not address the 
precise manner in which these interests and priorities manifest in my work, 
but rather serves more as a necessary background for the more concrete 
discussions in Chapters Two and Three; to draw a more direct connection 
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between a general aesthetic world-view and the minutiae of my scores would 
be somewhat disingenuous. Rather, the ideas discussed in this chapter serve 
as a vaguely-defined but forcefully present rubric guiding the development of 
my compositional approach.   
1.1 Framing and intentionality 
The Codex Seraphinianus’s ambiguity – its identity in the face of semantic 
openness – is the result of various orders of framing. Firstly, and most 
obviously, it is a book (a fact reinforced by its title), and is therefore 
presumably to be read. From the outset, then, the reader is engaging with the 
Codex through the lens – the frame – of “the book”, assessing it in terms of the 
ways in which it does or does not fit within it. The Codex continues to build 
frames, although the contents of those frames exist at variance with what we 
expect: the arrangement of ideographs clearly frames the written word, 
despite its contents being asemic. 
I understand the concept of the frame to refer to a type of contingent 
contextualisation. By framing perceived material in any given way, the 
possible meaning or identity of its contents is altered. Or rather, the infinite 
field of possible meaning of a single sensory datum is limited and defined by 
the succession of frames through which it is examined. I purposely define the 
notion of the frame as loosely as possible: it is any device or attitude that 
serves to constrict, partition or colour sensory data.  
The nature of the frame conveys the possible intentionality of that frame’s 
contents. By “intentionality” I refer to a kind of intended, unambiguous, 
univalent identity. 
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Thus, in the case of the Codex Seraphinianus, the frame of the written word 
leads the reader to engage with the “words” as words, the sorts of 
relationships between sense objects we search for are the sorts of things that 
might be important in written language: repeated letters, length of groupings 
of letters (i.e. words) and so forth. We simultaneously discard those elements 
that are, with respect to written language, unimportant, such as the precise 
physical relationship of elements on the page with respect to one another. In 
hypothetical absence of the grouping of the Codex’s ideographs into “words” 
(e.g. if the symbols were simply scattered randomly across the page), the 
“written language” frame may not be sufficiently constituted to be 
perceptually effective. Rather than treating these elements as letters, 
constituent parts of words, the reader might start to consider the elements on 
the page in terms of their correspondence in geometrical space, possible 
groupings or connections between visually similar symbols, and so forth. 
The framing of intentionality, in both a global sense, such as the distinction 
between musical listening and environmental listening, and a local sense, 
such as one notated element framing and therefore informing the identity of 
another notated element, is the quality of framing that is of primary interest in 
terms of my own practice, as will be explored throughout the following 
discussion. 
Peter Ablinger has described the frame as a constriction, a sort of filtering 
which changes the way we see the contents of that frame: 
Our field of vision is too wide to see. Our life is too big to perceive. Vision and 
experience come only through constriction, enclosing. … We know something as 
soon as we focus on the excerpt, constrict, observe a detail, and detail means setting a 
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frame. Framing can be a mode of thought, a method, a criterion – any type of filter…i 
(Ablinger 1995, p.3)  
The frame of the performance situation effectively separates the musical 
content from its surroundings – it partitions a certain subset of total sensory 
input. It is also highly significant in that it provides both an implied function 
for the sensory data which comprise the music, suggesting a certain mode of 
listening, an implicit hierarchicalisation of the types of relationship that are 
privileged in such a context. 
David Clarke describes music as a system of signs, pointing out that this is a 
characteristic common to all phenomena that we recognise as music (2009, 
p.111). It is precisely this characteristic that is designated by the performative 
frame. The presence of the frame implied by musical performance indicates to 
us that the signs present within the confines that performance constitute a 
single “closed” system. This reconstitution through framing of a collection of 
sensory data as a system of signs is crucial to the effect and function of a piece 
such as John Cage’s 4’33” (1952). The qualities of musical listening implied by 
this frame (in other words, the toolkit with which we are invited to listen to 
this piece) are distinguished from everyday listening by Eric Clarke as 
involving “…attending to the qualities and properties of sounds in 
themselves, and their purely sonorous relations with one another. By contrast, 
everyday listening involves detecting the objects and events in the world that 
are specified by sounds.” (E. Clarke 2005, p.133). The environmental sounds 
enclosed within the frame implied by the performance are not music until 
they are heard as such, but once they are heard as such, their perceptual status 
is fundamentally altered. The very act of framing those sounds as music 
makes them so. 
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This is actually a relatively philosophically controversial statement, as 
evidenced by the fact that the status of 4’33” as a piece of music at all is still 
contested some sixty years after its premiere. Varèse’s widely-quoted claim 
that “music is organised sound” (Goldman 1961, p.133) immediately raises 
the question “organised by whom?” While commonly assumed to indicate the 
necessity of a composer-author who organises the sound, Varèse’s view does 
not necessarily conflict with the notion that “music is whatever people choose 
to recognise as such” (Nattiez 1990, p.48), a recognition that seems predicated 
upon some form of framing of intention. 
Framing and intentionality are approached from a slightly different direction 
by Randolph Jordan. Discussing the work of sound artist Hildegard 
Westerkamp, he describes this sort of listening as a process of “re-
composing”: 
Westerkamp suggests that, as children, ‘listening and soundmaking (input and 
output, impression and expression) were ongoing activities, like breathing, 
happening simultaneously, always in relation to each other, in a feedback process’. 
This simultaneity of listening and sound-making is something Westerkamp would 
have us hold on to as adults. Westerkamp has an approach to ecology that reorders 
the ecological systems under observation in order to express their potential 
permutations in other contexts. Again, this is a model based on her notion of the 
soundwalk, which includes the practice of deconstructing the soundscape within our 
minds as we separate sounds that are often heard as one, and then sorting them into 
categories based on their pleasantness to our ears. The goal is to understand the 
soundscape as a composition so that we might compose better soundscapes in the 
future. This amounts to a psychological reordering of the heard environment that she 
emulates in her soundscape compositions. We’ve heard Derrida suggest that to read 
is to rewrite. For Westerkamp, to listen is to compose. (Jordan 2007, p.137) 
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Conceiving of the listener as actively composing (or re-composing) in 
response to sound stimuli sheds further light on framing and intentionality in 
4’33”. Through the soundscape’s recontextualisation within the frame of a 
piece of music – the suggestion of its subordination to the sorts of 
relationships implied by the concept “music” – the literal significations of 
those sounds (car noise, the clearing of a throat) fall away, they cease to 
embody the functions to which we have become attuned and leave us with 
the resonance of their “potential permutations” in this reordered context. 
While Cage’s oft-quoted maxim of “let the sounds be themselves” (quoted in 
Fuchs, [n.d.]) may seem to suggest that he is searching for a supposed 
“neutrality” of sound (particularly when combined with such a seemingly 
loaded term as “non-intentional”), in fact Cage is simply eschewing a model 
of musical transmission in which a “message” is transmitted, in as transparent 
and lossless a fashion as feasible, to a listener. In this sense, the term 
“soundscape” seems inapposite. 4’33”, rather than describing the sound 
events of a given segmentation of time, renders, by suppressing or relocating 
the usual conditions of meaning-construction and identification through the 
mechanism of the frame, the sounds that it contains as charged possibilities, 
pregnant with potential intention. 
Matthias Fuchs describes non-intentionality: “In the moment in which our 
activity engages in the process, we change it, and thereby distort it. … ‘Let the 
sounds be themselves’ should not be interpreted as a move away from 
hearing (leave the sounds alone), but rather, on the contrary, sets the path for 
an un-dulled, attentive passivity (listen to the sounds as they themselves 
are).”ii 
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In pieces other than 4’33”, such as Music of Changes – the compositional 
process of which is discussed in Silence (Cage 1968) – Cage’s approach to non-
intentionality was largely focussed on suppressing the intentionality of the 
compositional process (in Fuchs’s words, to suppress the distortive qualities 
of the act of composition). However, chance compositional procedures don’t 
necessarily lead to an audited musical construct that is any less “intentional” 
than a rigorously serial approach. It only sidesteps the implication that the 
compositional process itself can possibly be regarded at perceptibly 
intentional in its own right – it subverts the notion that intentionality is 
something originating exclusively with the composer. This paradox is 
highlighted by Ablinger (2007), who describes all sounds as being intentional, 
with that intentionality being something that needs to be “discovered” by the 
listener. I would phrase it differently: that no sounds are intentional, and that 
intention is invariably a property of the listener (Husserl, 1970), imposed 
through their own perception of sensory data through the contextually-
dependant framing of that data. As David Clarke suggests, “as an intentional 
being I am constantly involved in forming internal representations of the 
external world from my sense data.” (D. Clarke 2009, p.112), and it is this 
forming of internal representations that constitutes the uncovering of 
intentionality, the means of which is informed by the frame. 
1.2 Traces and transmission 
One image of musical practice is that it follows a sender-receiver model: the 
composer transmits information to the performer via the score; the performer 
then transmits the intentions of the composer to the audience via their 
performance. It is precisely this model or an unproblematically transmitted 
message that Cage’s approaches to non-intentionality are attempting to 
	   22	  
subvert. Such a conception, followed to its logical conclusion, implies a 
certain ethics of compositional practice: if the score is, at root, a transmissive 
document, it has, perhaps, an obligation to maximum clarity, maximum 
reproducibility. In other words, the score should be that which best 
guarantees that the performed result will maximally resemble the composer’s 
conception of the sound of the music. Such a sender-receiver model gives rise 
to the possible interpretation that, ideally, the listener should “receive” the 
intentionality “sent” by the composer, with the act of performance being a 
variable to be managed, an inevitable “gap” in a communicatory chain that 
should be minimised as far as possible. For me, on the other hand, the 
opportunities afforded by what happens in this gap are a highly interesting 
feature in their own right. 
Jean-Jacques Nattiez describes the semiology of musical practice very 
differently, through the use of the diagram shown in Fig. 1. He explains this 
diagram as follows: 
(a) a symbolic form (a poem, a film, a symphony) is not some “intermediary” in a 
process of “communication” that transmits the meaning intended by the author 
to an audience; 
(b) it is instead the result of a complex process of creation (the poietic process) that 
has to do with the form as well as the content of the work; 
(c) it is also the point of departure for a complex process of reception (the esthesic 
process) that reconstructs a “message”. (p.17) 
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Fig. 1: semiology of musical practice (Nattiez 1990, p.17). 
 
Nattiez’s model, on a level of compositional practice, implies no particular 
value or priority for the score itself. The act of composition becomes 
concerned with the nature of the “trace” to be left, rather than concerned with 
transmission as such. The transmission model outlined above is not 
precluded, but it is reduced to being one of a potentially infinite number of 
approaches to the constellation of possible attitudes towards “the trace”. 
This dislocation of the fact of the trace from the intention of the composer also 
situates it in substantially more neutral terms than the transmission model, as 
non-intentional sensory source-material from which “meaning” can be 
formed.  
The compositional processes and strategies I employ in my own practice are 
intensely concerned with the nature of the resulting trace, first as a score to be 
interpreted by a performer (on which more below), and secondly in terms of 
the sort of “probable trace” this performer-score engagement will result in 
through the act of performance for a listener. My approach, then, assumes the 
presence of two separate traces (the score and the performance) whereas 
Nattiez, at least in the summarised encapsulation above, conflates the two 
into a single “symbolic form”. My music aims to create contexts in which the 
role of the performer is both poietic and esthesic, both productive and 
receptive. 
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Peter Ablinger describes his own relationship with the “esthesic process” as 
follows: 
…the perhaps most essential – or to me most precious – aspects of art do not function 
after the sender-receiver model of message transmission. Better, perhaps, if we 
reverse the causal chain – which is naturally strongly forbidden! – and make the artist 
the receiver, and the perceiver the sender. Better even, if the reception, the 
receptiveness, the capability is itself made into a membrane, to be picked up through 
vibrations, as actual transmission is; if the transmission is not passed-on information 
(confirmation, fact), but rather the questioning of the factual and the softening of the 
calcified. So if nothing is passed on from the artist (no data), but rather, in the 
recipient, something like a new/undiscovered sense opens itself (something that 
itself produces data – just as if the perceiver applies new software), and the opening 
creates a place for sensation (sensory data), that can, much more than the artwork 
itself, take on the form of information, of a message. (Ablinger 2007, 5-6)iii 
What I find particularly engaging about this notion is that he makes no 
particular value judgement about musical “material” per se, but rather about 
modes of listening. Ablinger is expressing a preference for a musical trace that 
either permits or requires him to interact with the sensory data.  
This sheds light on Ablinger’s own concerns in works such as Parker Notch 
(2010) for solo melodic instrument and CD, in which a literal transcription of 
a Charlie Parker solo is almost entirely obliterated by white noise, only the 
faintest vestiges of what is nominally “the music” being audibly available to 
the listener, or in Music 4 Turtles (2011) for four brass instruments, in which a 
rising microtonal scale is alternated with silence, the changing proportions 
(sounds gradually get shorter, silences gradually get longer) of which are 
driven to extremes across the course of the piece, changing the perceived 
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primary material from the scale itself to the increasingly charged and 
pregnant silences.  
Music 4 Turtles sets up a context within which the boundaries of material 
framing become problematic. Here the frames implied by local detail (the 
proportional lengths of sound and silence) provide a context within which we 
“locate” musical significance. The piece commences with sounds (the scale), 
framed by silence. These silences grow longer, while the scale fragments grow 
shorter. At some point, the length of the scale fragments (at the end of the 
piece a fraction of a second in duration) in reference to the extended length of 
the silences (culminating in a silence of one minute or more), results in a 
situation where the sound is too short to constitute “material”, while the 
silences are too long to constitute “frames”. There is a reversal. The sounds 
start to frame extended durations of silence, and the silence, by virtue of being 
framed in such a way, takes on immense structural importance.  
My own experience of hearing the premiere of this piece was of a gradual 
change in the “loudness” of the silences, as the piece progressed through an 
ambiguous transitional phase between the two different frames, culminating 
in a silence that was almost deafening. This was not Cage’s “silence”, in 
which environmental sound takes on musical significance. I perceived a kind 
of “digital” silence, in which I became acutely aware of my breathing, my 
heartbeat, my tiny movements, all the myriad ways in which I, however 
slightly, disturbed the stillness around me. The undifferentiated nature of the 
material (a single silence, about one minute in duration) became relentless 
and terrifying, while the temporal experience of that material rendered it 
intensely uncertain (the length of the silence cannot be ascertained until the 
frame is completed).  
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This is a highly personal response to that particular piece, and Ablinger’s 
point in the quote above is that the mental change in software – including 
responses such as stark psychological terror, but more importantly the 
location and nature of the perceived change in frame – is located at the site of 
perception: the construction of intentionality is an individual thing, informed 
by the perceiver’s own psychology. 
This highlights an apparent paradox at the heart of the concept of the frame: 
the frame is something that implies ways of perceiving, but it is itself in large 
part constructed in reference to things perceived. This is where notions of 
ecological attunement become important. 
1.3 Ecology and attunement 
Individual experience’s central role in shaping perception is central to 
ecological approaches to musical perception such as Eric Clarke’s (2005), 
which treat musical sound objects as being like any other sound experienced 
in day-to-day experience, in that they take on signification through repeated 
exposure: that is, that invariant elements (such as harmonic behaviours in 
tonal music) are something we become attuned to, that there is a process of 
gradual, life-long enculturation allowing us to interact with music in a 
sympathetic way.  
The sorts of frames we summon, and the facility with which those frames are 
constructed, are grounded in our entire prior history of perception. To most 
listeners, the frame implied by tonal musical behaviours comes readily to 
hand, at an unconscious level. Frames of such ubiquity, verging on the 
semiotically meaningful, are referred to in the ecological literature as 
“invariants”, although it must be pointed out that in some ways this is a 
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misleading term, as the precise implications of such a frame will vary 
immensely from individual to individual. The point stands, however, that at a 
level of perceptual recognition such invariants have a meaningful impact, in 
the same way that, while individuals, when asked to picture a “chair”, may 
come up with any number of different variations on the chair, most would 
recognise an object belonging to the conceptual invariant of “chair”. 
The role of experience is underscored in phenomenology by Husserl, who 
suggests that the perceptual assignation of indicators is based on empirical 
evidence, and is probabilistic – that is, that apprehension is a function of the 
probability, based on prior experience, that a given sensory datum belongs to 
one state of affairs, and not another (Husserl 1970). 
To continue with the previous musical example, Music 4 Turtles relies for its 
effect in part on the tenuousness of the attunement to certain of its materials, 
and strength of attunement to others. We are highly attuned to the notion of 
the scale (even though it is here presented in microtonal, timbrally dispersed 
form between the four instruments). The fact that the scale continues across 
the course of the piece draws a direct line “across” the silences. It could be 
argued that we are, through our experience of the Western canon, attuned to 
musical silence as a point of rest framing “real” musical content, and the 
beginning of the piece indeed sits easily within such a conception. But the 
continuation of the scale frames the silence not as such a point of rest (as in 
between movements of a symphony) but rather as the “digital” silence 
alluded to earlier. It is framed not as a point of repose, but as a structural 
element within the piece, a possible intention that is subsequently reinforced 
through the continuing shifts in proportion during the piece’s duration. This 
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takes place because of the relatively weak attunement to intentionalities of 
silence when compared with the invariant represented by the scale. 
1.4 Redundancy 
The sensory “opening” that Ablinger (2007) describes is a result of a kind of 
lack of transmitted information from the work: a degree of insufficiency. This, 
perhaps, is related to Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf’s description of “lacunarisation 
of musical discursivity”, as a compositional method employed in what he 
rather taxonomically refers to as “musical deconstruction” (Mahnkopf 2004, 
pp.17-18).  
The centrality of insufficiency here is relevant because of Ablinger’s belief that 
redundancy is central to the forming of information: 
Information IS redundancy: 
The tautology, according to Wittgenstein, says nothing about the world and holds no 
relationship at all to it (Tractatus). I believe, on the other hand, that the tautology is 
the grounding principle of language in general. More specifically, the grounding 
principle of the relationship of language and world. Every description, explanation, 
analysis, definition is exactly – in an analogous way – a doubling, repetition, or 
redundancy, just as the tautology itself is. Something similar also goes for 
“information”. It is not true, that information is that which stands apart from 
redundancies. It is much more the other way around, that information without 
redundancy is not possible at all. Redundancy has something to do with “frames”; 
repeating something means to get closer to it, to fix it, to cut it out from its 
environment, frame it. The same also goes for “meaning”: meaning and duplication 
or underlining, emphasis, are almost synonymous anyway. Meaning, information, 
understanding are all redundancy-contingent transformations of that that is. But that 
that is is the insignificant, not-informative, un-understood: the world, as it surrounds 
us and we in it. (Ablinger 1995, pp.2-3)iv 
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In other words, it is precisely the qualities of the mutual reinforcement of 
signs, the resonant spaces between them, that give those signs meaning. 
David Clarke uses a Venn diagram to describe the process of giving meaning 
to signs: 
 
Fig. 2: David Clarke’s depiction of signification (2009, p.127). 
 
Clarke’s image is intended to relate to the formation of perceptual objects in 
time. We hear a sensory datum c, and then the datum c’. They each have a field 
of possibility informed, as Eric Clarke and Husserl (1970) indicate, by our 
experience of similar data. The point of overlap between these two fields 
designates the perceived object. In other words, that it is the area of 
redundancy between these two signs that produces a defined object. I would 
add that, as a model of perception in time, it’s important to note that c will 
frame our understanding of the possible significance of c’ much more than the 
other way around.  
As we turn our attention to how the foregoing concerns manifest in my own 
practice, we’ll see that I am much more interested in the implications of non-
redundancy. To continue with David Clarke’s model, I am interested in 
situations where a relationship between c and c’ is not reconcilable with the 
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relationship between c’ and a hypothetical c”. Or situations in which there is 
significant degree of incongruence between a strongly implied frame on one 
hand, and its contents on the other. 
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2. COMPOSITIONAL PROCESS AS FRAMING, SCORE AS TRACE 
In the introduction I described the way I understand my compositional 
responsibilities as being twofold. The principal responsibility, the 
responsibility to which actual compositional process is subservient, is as the 
architect of specific types of interaction between the trace (manifested in both 
the score and the sounding result). In this sense, my work as a composer 
results in a document that, through its charged ambiguity, frames the means 
of its own interpretation, and the faithful execution of which (a matter of the 
nature of the engagement between performer and score, as much as literal 
replication of the notated elements) will result in a particular framing of the 
listener’s perceptual interaction with the performance. My primary 
responsibility is to access qualities of performer agency and subsequently, in a 
deferred, delegated and diminished sense, listener agency.  
The second responsibility is the production of the score itself, which is the 
focus of this chapter. This process is itself entirely reliant on subjective levels 
of framing in two important and distinct ways. The first is that the process 
comprises multiple iterations of processual framing, gradually moving closer 
and closer to a final result. The second is in the conception of material as 
being primarily modulatory in function; that is, material is selected for the 
ways in which it articulates a possible frame for its own context. 
The compositional phase (and the processes that this entails) leads to the 
production of a score, a trace. While, in line with the responsibilities assumed 
by the process outlined above, a great deal of time is spent considering the 
ways in which the performer may interact with this trace, and ways in which 
listeners may interact with the subsequent performative trace, the score is a de 
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facto result of the sedimentation of framing processes, rather than a 
preconceived goal to which these framing processes are subservient. The 
interaction between performer and score, or between listener and 
performance, are not intentionally architected, but rather necessarily resultant 
from the process of composition. 
2.1.1 Process as frame 
To produce his large abstract paintings, Gerhard Richter begins with a canvas 
painted in large blocks of colour. Before the paint is completely dry, he 
employs large squeegees to smear and scrape those colours across the canvas. 
Once the paint has been redistributed in this way, the colours mixing and 
overlaying themselves upon one another, the process is repeated. Then the 
process is repeated again. Sometimes additional paint will be added. 
Sometimes, the uneven drying of oil paint before it is scraped in this way will 
produce a kind of “blister”, lacunae that reveal a layer of dried colour below. 
The resultant artwork is the result of layers and layers of paint (typically 
between thirty and fifty iterations of the smearing and overpainting process), 
bearing no resemblance whatsoever to the original starting point. 
Aside from the utterly enthralling visual result, what I find most striking 
about Richter’s work is the nature of the process itself. Each of these layers of 
smearing and scraping is conducted in response to the results of the previous 
layer. That is, the previous layer provides a frame that shapes all subsequent 
action, despite the fact that the evidence of that frame may be entirely 
obscured after even a few further steps (Buchloh 2009). 
My compositional process is in many respects very similar. What appeals to 
me about a working process such as this is the emphasis it places on the act of 
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discovery. At each stage, the task is one of uncovering the potential 
intentionalities of the material in its current, unfinished form. At a later stage, 
these intentionalities may be rendered invisible by my own subsequent 
compositional actions, but the response to them at that time necessarily affects 
the final makeup of the piece. 
The compositional process is a process of constant framing, constricting the 
total field of possibilities embodied by the space inhabited by the sound. The 
particular nature of the frame at any given time modulates its contents. That 
constriction is, however, not a compulsory limitation, but rather the result of a 
perceptual act, a sort of compositional listening to the existing material. 
The three pieces from imagines me into systems smeared along wires (2011) to 
maps living among the ice of the room (2011) were all produced with a single 
string of four numbers (3, 5, 8, 2). While I had certain very general ideas about 
the soundworld of each piece, largely informed by the instrumentations, I had 
no specific preconceptions regarding what the pieces would actually do. All 
material is derived in some way through processual operations performed on 
the data set present at each stage. Thus, the first stage of composition is 
undertaken with only those four numbers available, and the proportions and 
behaviours they seem to imply.  
This limitation of means, combined with the retention of ordinal relationships 
(those four numbers, or their derivatives, are invariably presented in their 
original order) results in what Brian Ferneyhough has described in a lecture at 
the Abbaye de Royaumont as a “canonic” approach to material development 
(23 August 2010), on the basis that the same numerical materials are being 
utilised at different rates through time, although personally I find this 
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stretches the analogy to canon to the point of near-meaninglessness. 
Certainly, however, some of the resulting patterns are much more 
meaningfully canonic (such as the pitch behaviours in in the honeycombs of 
memory he built a house for the swarm of his thoughts (2011)), leading to sorts of 
“normative” relationships and behaviours spanning the entire course of the 
piece (recurring intervals, patterns that recur through the ensemble, etc), 
which are subsequently subverted and problematised by their changing 
context. As Ferneyhough describes in his essay “Il tempo della figura”: 
In fact, such considerations have little to do with neo-serial manias for order; rather, 
they reveal a path towards the redefinition of function through the context-bound 
deployment of local, informal parametric manipulation. The constant creation of 
‘fuzzy parameters’ of this sort is the primary purpose of the figure, to the extent that 
it supports the deconstruction and subsequent opening-up of the self-enclosed 
organism in an indefinite number of possible directions. (Ferneyhough 1995, p.38-39). 
Ferneyhough’s description of such “fuzzy parameters” point directly to the 
notion of frames, and the shifting intentionality of any given notated element 
as a result of the changing hierarchies between the frame and the framed in 
the light of such processual strategies. Furthermore, the “deconstruction and 
subsequent opening-up of the self-enclosed organism” is identifiable as the 
absence of redundancy (in the sense described in the previous chapter) that 
results from the decoupling of normally-coincident and co-dependent musical 
parameters. 
2.1.2 Material as frame, frame as material 
In some respects I find it difficult to discuss material in a concrete way, 
because of the ongoing difficulties I have discussing “material” without the 
compulsory addition of “scare-quotations”. In terms of my own practice, the 
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sorts of materials with which composition traditionally engages (pitch, 
rhythm, dynamics, articulations, etc) constitute valid material only by virtue 
of the manner in which their combination results in a defining of a musical 
space-time.  
The “material” of these pieces is not the collection of notated pitches or 
rhythms, but rather the frame itself, as manifested firstly in the gradual 
shaping of context through the process of composition, and secondly in the 
modulatory qualities possessed by notated elements themselves, their 
propensity to frame and shape their surroundings.  
In terms of notated elements, “material” only becomes material in its 
combination with other “materials”, with such a combination radically 
altering the identity of all component elements. For this reason, materials do 
not retain constant value: it is impossible to describe any given notated 
element as being “structurally significant” in the way we might be 
accustomed to describing the pitch material of a tonal (or, for that matter, 
strictly serial) piece. Elements have, rather, a transitory, modulatory value, 
rather than definition in and of themselves. A fingered “G” on the bass 
clarinet is not a concrete entity in itself, but rather a limiting field acting upon 
the other materials with which it coincides. Each notated element is, in effect, 
a frame that recontextualises all other materials. 
The final line of the bass clarinet part of imagines me into systems smeared along 
wires (2011) is an interesting case in point. 
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Fig. 3: imagines me into systems smeared along wires (2011), bass clarinet, 
mm.121-125 
 
The metric structure describes a steady reduction in the distance between 
impulses, but these pulses are articulated only in the “pitch” line of the bass 
clarinet, and almost completely obscured by the presence of ties across the bar 
line, relegating the function of metre to a deeply recessed organiser of 
temporal space, rather than something possessing a tangible identity of its 
own. Any sense of perceived metricity is almost certainly produced by the 
sforzando markings in the red layer, alluding to an alternate progression of 
time. The notated pitches themselves are destabilised by the constant trills, 
and in any event serve merely as a grounding “tube length” for the harmonic 
sweeps produced by the extreme changes in embouchure, the imposition of 
the teeth, and so forth. Any linear identity suggested by these elements is 
further undermined by the constant imposition of ornamental figures, 
diaphragm vibrato, smorzato, vocalisations and fluttertongue. 
It is next to impossible to make categorical claims about what, specifically, the 
resulting sound objects will be, as this is so dependant on the individual 
performance, and even the order in which these layers are learned (a 
consideration of which forms part of the next chapter). The final production of 
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objects will necessarily result from the performer’s judgement as to relative 
structural significance; that is, what frames what. The result will be different 
depending on, for example, whether the fingering patterns are regarded as 
the fundamental frame through which everything else is approaches, or 
whether that honour goes to the shifting embouchure shape throughout the 
passage. 
“Material”, then, is the notated result of layers upon layers of aggregated 
compositional process (including the selection and combination of concrete 
instrumental activity), the sedimentation of which shapes the possibilities of 
engagement with musical space-time. Just as the instructions contained 
within the score are conceived as being primarily modulatory, so are the 
processes generating the piece itself, with each new layer of compositional 
activity modifying, elaborating or distorting the existing data set. This is all 
compositional material. 
A consequence of such a constantly framed, constantly modulatory approach 
to the compositional process is the impossible of anything but a highly 
postulatory composer-defined intentionality. No single element on the page 
can be truly and singularly intentional in its own right (it cannot assert its 
own, unproblematic signification) because of the invariably ambiguating 
context surrounding it; a context that necessarily arises as a result of the 
process of successive layering. 
In order to better flesh out this conception of the process of successive 
framing as material in its own right, I will briefly step through a number of 
these successive layers of work, considering the sorts of modulatory qualities 
they exhibit, and the sorts of priorities with which they are treated.  
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2.2 Temporal structure 
From shattenzeichen (2010) through to maps living among the ice of the room 
(2011), the temporal structure has been the first thing categorically defined by 
the process of composition. As with anything else though, the metric 
structure, tempo, and the coloured layers of rhythmic information are not 
treated as valid “material” in their own right, but rather as a series of certain 
qualities of potentiality that frame, contextualise, reinforce and undermine 
one another. The process of defining metre is, itself, the result of a series of 
different mutually informative processes, dealing first with numerators, then 
mapping zones of relative “dissonance”, followed by the selection of 
denominators. 
2.2.1 Metre – general comments 
It is worth making, before proceeding, some general remarks about metre, 
most pertinently with regard to the definition of the term. Mats Johansen 
offers a number of possibilities for a definition of metre: 
1) Meter as a measuring device, specifying the temporal relationships 
between rhythmic units and levels (beats per measure etc.). 2) Meter as an 
imposed or inferred accentuation pattern (strong-weak-weak etc.). 3) Meter as 
an emerging property of the listener’s engagement with the unfolding music, 
implying that there is no pre-existing neutral grid in relation to which 
musical sounds are rhythmically structured. 4) A formulaic conception of 
meter: a stylistically coded (i.e. culture-specific) notion of sameness resulting 
from a continuously ongoing process of trying out different, but metrically 
equivalent, rhythmic designs. (Johansen 2010, p.41). 
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In general, I would subscribe to the third of these definitions of metre, 
particularly in the sense that by virtue of its grounding in perception, it is 
distinct from the first of these definitions, which is based more exclusively on 
time signature per se. I would go further, though, to suggest that metre, as a 
result of the origin in perception of the metric “grid”, has an important role in 
mediating the perception of the flow of musical time itself. Furthermore, such 
a definition also presumes the possibility of “protension” (Husserl 1986), a 
fact that becomes important later on in the compositional process. 
An important qualification to this is, however, that the first stage of 
developing the temporal world of these recent pieces is limited to metre as 
recognised in the first definition above: a definition of time signature alone. 
All of my temporal processes (including definition of tempo and coloured 
time layers), limited as they are to the distributing of periodic impulses, are 
all designed to culminate in a number of simultaneously “potential” 
perceived metricities – a “multivalent” metricity (London 2001) – rather than 
actively composing an audible metricity as articulated in the third of 
Johansen’s definitions. So, when discussing how these processes result in 
metre, what we are really talking about is the definition of time signature 
with a view to its potential for subsequent expression as heard metre. Any 
post hoc analysis of the perceived metricity of a performance of my music 
would bear little resemblance to the notated metric scheme. In the following 
discussion, it is important to note that when perceptual qualities of different 
metric contexts are discussed, this is with reference to a hypothetical 
“categorically expressed” metric scheme, such as would be the case when 
listening to a click-track (of which extensive use was made when developing 
	   40	  
my approaches to metre), rather than the far more obscure perceptual reality 
resulting from the final score.  
With this in mind, my “metric” vocabulary comprises an extended collection 
of so-called “irrational” metres. The use of irrational metres was pioneered by 
Brian Ferneyhough, in pieces such as Superscriptio (1981) for solo piccolo. This 
notational technique has since been employed by a substantial number of 
composers, although it largely still remains identified with the so-called 
“New Complexity”. Briefly, the principle is the same as in standard time 
signature nomenclature, with the semibreve divided into an equal number of 
equidistant pulses as defined by the bottom number. Thus a 5/12 bar 
comprises five triplet quavers, a 3/28 bar comprises three septuplet 
semiquavers, and so on. The vocabulary I employ is limited to time signatures 
featuring the numbers 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, and 28 as the 
denominator. 
I employ metric changes in favour of tempo changes in part because it “hard 
codes” these changes in pulse density into the fabric of the score: they notate a 
proportional relationship between consecutive bars, rather than with 
reference to an external fixed point (beats per minute), and in part because it 
allows a further layer of tempo information to take an active role in the 
problematisation and modulation of this layer. 
The following discussion will explain the procedure I developed for 
determining the metric scheme in recent pieces. This procedure comprises 
three separate processes, in which first the numerator is defined; then a 
scheme is developed whereby the changing degree of mutual metric 
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“interference” between successive bars is mapped out; and finally the 
denominator is defined in reference to that scheme of interference. 
2.2.2 Metre – defining the numerator  
As mentioned above, in the case of everything written since imagines me into 
systems smeared along wires (2011), the originating ur-material was a single 
string of four numbers (3, 5, 8, 2). Due to the fact that these numbers were 
going to be employed in a variety of ways to define a variety of things, they 
were chosen with a view to their possible manipulation with minimal 
redundancies, as well as their useable size (if larger numbers are required, 
these can be achieved through a process of addition), as well as the rich 
quality of the proportions existing between them. 
This series of numbers constitutes the original frame through which all 
subsequent decisions are mediated (albeit at ever-increasing removal). This 
frame – this originating material – is made up of the proportions and 
relationships implied by these four numbers, and the various mathematical 
relationships in which they may stand with one another. Conversely, these 
four numbers are framed by the necessity to achieve certain types of 
“material” or behaviour from them. In other words, the need for these four 
numbers to voice a metric structure is itself a frame. The initial compositional 
stage, then, is one of “listening” to the potentialities implied by this collection 
of numbers. 
Through a process of folding and refolding, extrapolating and adding, these 
numbers and their implied proportions are manipulated until they have 
produced a sequence of numbers that, in my assessment, can feasibly define 
the numerator of every bar in the piece. The precise manner in which this has 
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been achieved has varied, and it’s important to note that this process is, itself, 
a multi-layered response to a gradually evolving state of affairs. Ultimately it 
results in a series of numbers that seem like they will be interesting to work 
with at subsequent compositional stages. While this manipulation is, at this 
point, divorced from any definite musical “function” as such, as Pierluigi 
Billone observed to me in a lesson, the numbers “speak” to me (private lesson, 
27 August 2011). The decisions regarding these numbers are a response to the 
existing frame. There are certain sorts of things that I am hoping they will do, 
and certain things that I am hoping they won’t. That said, the factor of them 
being “interesting to work with” is an important one: a particular solution is 
frequently reached over another, equally “valid” solution, purely because the 
framing implications of that solution seem more entertaining at a 
compositional level. 
My priorities in arriving at a numerator plan typically revolve around 
variation in the efficacy of the numerator series over time in its role of 
defining metre, particularly in a context where the denominator will be 
changing with every bar. 
Given that each bar is to be defined by a different pulse density (the 
denominator will be changing every measure), these bars have a core function 
as an area of pulse activity. The clarity with which such pulse-width identities 
are articulated is a function of the numerator. Very short and very long bars 
are less useful (less forceful) than a series of moderately-sized bars. 
Immoderate bar lengths are still employed, but they represent a “pushing to 
an extreme”, in which the qualities of metric behaviour typically evinced 
throughout the piece cease to operate normally. As an aside, it is worth 
pointing out that it is the decision to privilege behaviours arising from 
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moderate bar-lengths that frames very long and very short bars as suggestive 
of a different function. 
Very short bars have an extremely limited capability to carry metric 
information, culminating in the inability of a 1/x bar to express metre at all. A 
sequence of 1/x bars (where the denominator x is changing each bar), such as 
in mm.92-95 of schattenzeichen (2010) (see Fig. 4, below), presents itself as a 
local rhythmic figuration, rather than being metric in quality. This limited 
metric capacity stems from the necessity of, at the very least, a second beat to 
construct perceptible metre. In an environment in which metre is changing 
literally every bar, this becomes absolutely necessary, in that all information 
on pulse length is derived from the duration between the onset of the first 
beat, and its end, as articulated by the onset of the second beat. In the absence 
of a second beat, the music has already progressed to a new pulse identity by 
the time that sufficient auditory information has been received to identify 
pulse-length, which, in light of the necessity of metre to be subject to 
protension (Husserl 1986), renders that bar unable to suggest metric identity. 
The opposite is also true. In an extremely long bar, the effect of constantly 
shifting pulse identities starts to dissipate. The bar ceases to be able to take on 
any role of a charged local pulse density, and seems more likely to be 
characterised as a stable zone of middle-ground activity. This can be seen in 
much of maps living among the ice of the room (2011) (see Fig. 5), many sections 
of which contain only a single denominator, locating the principal “charging” 
element with the tempo line. The fact that, despite this, the complex metric 
vocabulary is retained adds a further layer to the sense of the piece 
comprising an archipelago of ambiguous, hazy islands. 
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Fig. 4: schattenzeichen (2010), mm.91-96. 
 
Fig. 5: maps living among the ice of the room (2011) p.7, alto flute part. 
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2.2.3 Metre – defining the denominator 
Having mapped out the numerator of every bar in the piece, the next stage is 
to delimit zones of interference. By “interference”, here, I mean the degree of 
incongruity between two successive denominators, described as a function of 
their lowest common subdivision. I have typically referred to this interference 
in conversation with other composers and performers as a kind of metric 
“dissonance”, although the analogy to pitch is a highly imperfect one that is 
perhaps best avoided. 
I calculate the degree of interference by taking the product of the ratio 
between two subsequent denominators. For instance, in the case of a bar of 
3/8 followed by a bar of 3/12, denominators of 8 and 12 stand in a 12:8 
proportion, which can be reduced to their lowest common denominators of 
3:2, offering a final interference value of 6. On the other hand, a bar of 3/11 
followed by a bar of 3/18 has a ratio of 18:11, resulting in a final interference 
of 198. We can therefore suggest that the latter metric progression has a 
greater degree of interference than the former. The full table of these 
interrelationships is given in Fig. 6. 
As it stands, this is not a perfect method of defining this interference, as our 
perception of it does not take place in an arithmetically linear way. We can 
observe some of the weaknesses of a table such as the one above by 
examining an example such as the four progressions illustrated in Fig. 7. 
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 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 16 18 20 22 24 28 
8 1:1 
1 
8:9 
72 
4:5 
20 
8:11 
88 
2:3 
6 
8:13 
104 
4:7 
28 
1:2 
2 
4:9 
36 
2:5 
10 
4:11 
44 
1:3 
3 
2:7 
14 
9 9:8 
72 
1:1 
1 
9:10 
90 
9:11 
99 
3:4 
12 
9:13 
117 
9:14 
126 
9:16 
144 
1:2 
2 
9:20 
180 
9:22 
198 
3:8 
24 
9:28 
252 
10 5:4 
20 
10:9 
90 
1:1 
1 
10:11 
110 
5:6 
30 
10:13 
130 
5:7 
35 
5:8 
40 
5:9 
45 
1:2 
2 
5:11 
55 
5:12 
60 
5:14 
70 
11 11:8 
88 
11:9 
99 
11:10 
110 
1:1 
1 
11:12 
132 
11:13 
143 
11:14 
154 
11:16 
176 
11:18 
198 
11:20 
220 
1:2 
2 
11:24 
264 
11:28 
308 
12 3:2 
6 
4:3 
12 
6:5 
30 
12:11 
132 
1:1 
1 
12:13 
156 
6:7 
42 
3:4 
12 
2:3 
6 
3:5 
15 
6:11 
66 
1:2 
2 
3:7 
21 
13 13:8 
104 
13:9 
117 
13:10 
130 
13:11 
143 
13:12 
156 
1:1 
1 
13:14 
182 
13:16 
208 
13:18 
234 
13:20 
260 
13:22 
286 
13:24 
312 
13:28 
364 
14 7:4 
28 
14:9 
126 
7:5 
35 
14:11 
154 
7:6 
42 
14:13 
182 
1:1 
1 
7:8 
56 
7:9 
63 
7:10 
70 
7:11 
77 
7:12 
84 
1:2 
2 
16 2:1 
2 
16:9 
144 
8:5 
40 
16:11 
176 
4:3 
12 
16:13 
208 
8:7 
56 
1:1 
1 
8:9 
72 
4:5 
20 
8:11 
88 
2:3 
6 
4:7 
28 
18 9:4 
36 
2:1 
2 
9:5 
45 
18:11 
198 
3:2 
6 
18:13 
234 
9:7 
63 
9:8 
72 
1:1 
1 
9:10 
90 
9:11 
99 
3:4 
12 
9:14 
126 
20 5:2 
10 
20:9 
180 
2:1 
2 
20:11 
220 
5:3 
15 
20:13 
260 
10:7 
70 
5:4 
20 
10:9 
90 
1:1 
1 
10:11 
110 
5:6 
30 
5:7 
35 
22 11:4 
44 
22:9 
198 
11:5 
55 
2:1 
2 
11:6 
66 
22:13 
286 
11:7 
77 
11:8 
88 
11:9 
99 
11:10 
110 
1:1 
1 
11:12 
132 
11:14 
154 
24 3:1 
3 
8:3 
24 
12:5 
60 
24:11 
264 
2:1 
2 
24:13 
312 
12:7 
84 
3:2 
6 
4:3 
12 
6:5 
30 
12:11 
132 
1:1 
1 
6:7 
42 
28 7:2 
14 
28:9 
252 
14:5 
70 
28:11 
308 
7:3 
21 
28:13 
364 
2:1 
2 
7:4 
28 
14:9 
126 
7:5 
35 
14:11 
154 
7:6 
42 
1:1 
1 
 
Fig. 6: interference values of total field of denominators 
 
(a)   (b)  
3 
13 
4 
22 
 3 
13 
4 
28 
interference = 286  interference = 364 
(c)   (d)  
3 
8 
4 
14 
 3 
8 
4 
22 
interference = 28  interference = 44 
Fig. 7: examples of interference values for a number of metric progressions 
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According to the table, the difference in interference between (a) and (b) (a 
numerical difference of 78) should be far greater than that between (c) and (d) 
(a numerical difference of 16). But perceptually speaking this is simply not the 
case. There is effectively a scaling of effect as the more abstruse ratios are 
reached. 
I don’t regard the weaknesses (or, rather, incompleteness) of this approach to 
defining interference to be critical, so long as these weaknesses are properly 
considered and accounted for in the course of the compositional process. The 
precise means by which these weaknesses are minimised will be explored in 
detail momentarily. 
Zones of relative interference are defined throughout the piece, typically 
through repurposing existing numerical information drawn from the 
numerator scheme as a specification of a number of bars. At its most simple, 
the first numerator might describe the length (in bars) of the first zone, the 
second numerator the length of the second, etc. The following is an example 
invented for the sake of clarity (in practice the definition of these zones is 
somewhat less straightforward, as the underlying “system” is subjected to 
constant modification as I respond to the existing numerical material): 
bar no: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
numerator: 3 2 5 4 3 8 7 6 3 2 4 5 1 6 
zones: 3   2  5     4    
 
Once these zones have been mapped out, each of them is assigned an 
interference value, which is a number between 1 and 6. This assignation is 
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generally first performed as a rigidly systematic reading from numerical 
material already generated in the course of producing the numerator line. 
Subsequently, this will be “overpainted” by imposing certain behaviours 
inspired by that systematic distribution. For instance, the imposition of 
gradual (i.e. “stepwise”) increases or decreases in interference, as opposed to 
sudden jumping. In other words, there is also a “quality of motion” 
superimposed on these zones, although it is one intuitively determined in 
response to the more unguided systematic disposition. 
This zoned, six-step numerical description of interference is what permits the 
circumventing of the weaknesses inherent in my method of calculating 
interference, by treating interference as something that is (a) approximate; (b) 
relative; and (c) accrued over time. 
The table in Fig. 8 arranges all possible progressions from any given 
denominator (at left) in increasing order of interference (highlighted pairs are 
equivalent). The grey blocks along the top, numbered 1 to 6, designate the 
range of interference indicated by the number assigned to each zone in the 
score. For example, if the degree of interference is “3”, then starting from 
denominator 8, the possible choices for the next denominator are 20, 28 and 
10. If 20 is chosen, then for the following denominator 16, 24 and 28 are the 
possible choices, and so on. 
By having interference defined as something that remains valid for given 
collection of bars, the focus is taken off the individual motion from one bar to 
the next, and placed on the general accretion of interference behaviours. 
Rather than a single relationship needing to be universally valid, a series of 
relationships feeds into the fleshing out of the qualities of the limited 
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(approximately ten seconds) window of the musical present (D. Clarke 2009). 
Such an approach allows for the fact of retention in the perceptual act. 
Qualities of interference exist not only between consecutive bars, but also 
beyond (another flaw of the definition of interference). Husserl describes 
retention as the constant “falling back” of previous events in the 
consciousness of the current now-point (Husserl 1986). In other words, that 
events have an ongoing, although constantly diminishing, impact on our 
cognitive formation of objects in the present. In this sense, the use of the sort 
of process described above permits the generation of ongoing “types” of 
behaviour.  
Making the structuring of denominator behaviours into a (restricted) choice, 
crucially, allows it to respond to the existing numerator information. In other 
words, the compositional process itself is modulatory, uncovering potential 
energies contained within each stratum. 
What this process of defining metre has articulated, then, is a constant 
overlaying of different frames. By disaggregating seemingly co-dependent 
elements of numerator and denominator, and by defining denominator in 
response to a further zoning and definition, the process has been a constant 
exercise in responding to pre-existing layers. 
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   2  4  6 
 1  3  5   
8 8 16 24 12 20 28 10 14 18 22 9 11 13 
              
9 9 18 12 24 8 10 11 13 14 16 20 22 28 
              
10 10 20 8 12 14 16 18 22 24 28 9 11 13 
              
11 11 22 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 18 20 24 28 
              
12 12 24 18 8 9 16 20 28 10 14 22 11 13 
              
13 13 8 9 10 11 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 28 
              
14 14 28 8 10 12 16 18 20 22 24 9 11 13 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
16 16 8 24 12 20 28 10 14 18 22 9 11 13 
              
18 18 9 12 24 8 10 14 16 20 22 28 11 13 
              
20 20 10 8 12 16 24 28 14 18 22 9 11 13 
              
22 22 11 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 24 28 9 13 
              
24 24 12 8 16 18 9 20 28 10 14 22 11 13 
              
28 28 14 8 12 16 20 24 10 18 22 9 11 13 
 
Fig. 8: Possible metric progression ordered by interference value 
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2.2.4 Tempo 
While the metric grid provides a proportional map of pulse lengths for the 
duration of the piece, this remains abstract until described in “real” 
performance terms by the function of tempo. Tempo may be seen to 
invariably stand in a modulatory relationship to other rhythmic materials. My 
process seeks to amplify this fact by having tempo take on a far more audibly 
active role in the modulation of the piece’s temporal world (that is, that they 
become mutually modulatory, mutually framing). 
My tempo schemes reflect the following three priorities: 
1. the tempo scheme should permit the metric grid to “speak” (framing of 
metre by tempo, maximum redundancy between metric frame and tempo 
frame); 
2. the tempo should actively obscure, or smear the metric grid (minimal 
redundancy between metric frame and tempo frame); and 
3. the tempo should take perceptual precedence over the metric grid (framing 
of metre by tempo). 
Obviously, these three priorities are contradictory, and are not intended to 
operate simultaneously. The result is, ideally, a shifting ebb and flow between 
the perceptual prominence of metre and tempo, resulting in the engagement 
of the perceptual agency both of performer (as these shifting forces impact 
their own understanding of morphological priority) and listener (as their 
audition of the work alters their location of directional and interferential 
temporal force). 
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The first of these priorities is rather vague, and is best examined by looking at 
the ways in which metric identity is smeared or problematised in service of 
the second and third priorities. 
The conditions under which the metric identities implied by the notated 
metre are problematised by tempo activity fall under three broad categories: 
(a) extremes of metre; (b) foregrounding of tempo behaviours; and (c) 
subversion of metric relationships through simultaneous tempo changes. 
Extremes of tempo can make the notated metre incapable of expressing the 
quality of metricity (that is, its pulse content) itself.  
The passage in Fig. 9, from the accordion part of maps living among the ice of the 
room seems harmless enough, beginning at quaver=70, and finishing at 7513. 
But once the effect of the denominator is taken into account, in real terms the 
bar begins at 245bpm and finishes at almost 264bpm. 
McAuley (2010) points to research indicating that the physical limitations on 
metric efficacy lie at tempi of around 30bpm and 300bpm. The evidence for 
the upper figure is dictated by subjects’ ability to tap or nod to pulses at such 
tempi. I would argue that the perceptual reality is somewhat different; that at 
high tempi such as this, we begin to hear pulses, regardless of notated metre, 
as subdivisions of larger pulses, and that therefore this figure may be 
considerably lower.  
In this case, while I hesitate to suggest that the metre totally loses its identity, 
or presents as a larger metre (such as 7/14), the extreme rapidity of pulse does 
reduce the force of its identity as pulse in the context of everything else that is 
going on. 
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Metric identity is similarly problematised at extremely slow tempi, as in Fig. 
10. 
 
Fig. 9: maps living among the ice of the room (2011), accordion part, p.7. 
 
Fig. 10: imagines me into systems smeared along wires (2011), mm.89-94. 
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At a notated tempo of semiquaver=20 (carried over from the previous page), 
the “real” tempo of each bar in this excerpt is 13.75, 15, 16.25, 15, 13.75, and 
12.5 bpm, respectively. At such extremes, our lack of predictive ability, or, as 
Husserl would say, the impossibility of protension (1986), precludes metre’s 
vital measuring function, stops it from acting as a modulation of continuous 
perceived time, and sees it defining the start- and end-points of what seem 
more like structural periods. The pulses cease to be metric, and become 
durational instead. 
There are circumstances in which the identity of the tempo line, through its 
greater perceptual presence, obscures the identity of the metric grid. In my 
own work, this has manifested primarily through the use of accelerandi and 
rallentandi.  
The excerpt in Fig. 11 from maps living among the ice of the room (2011) is a 
relatively clear and extreme example. 
The entire page belongs notionally to a single metre, while the extreme (and 
short-range) changes in tempo, alternating between two different tempo 
systems (the first comprising the tempi quaver=50, 3313, 8223, 50, 3313, 623; the 
second comprising the tempi quaver=7513, 5014, 12312, 7513, 5014, 10), render the 
metre near meaningless. The temporal structure of the passage is entirely 
defined by the tempo identity. Furthermore, the sharpness of the changes (a 
more than doubling of the tempo over three beats, or the division of the 
tempo in 5 over two beats) challenges our ability to perceive these as even 
being tempo shifts at all. In this case, tempo is not only problematising the 
metric identity, but also its own identity. 
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Fig. 10: maps living among the ice of the room (2011). p.8. 
 
A less clearly delineated example can be found in the following passage from 
imagines me into systems smeared along wires (2011) (Fig. 12), in which the 
directionality of the tempo change takes over focus from the metric changes. 
The possibility of such a perceived change in foregrounding taking place in 
the above example is, as indicated above, predicated upon the size of the 
change (here it more than doubles in speed). Also a factor, however, is the 
low beat density at the beginning of the change. Quaver=25 is below 
McAuley’s stated minimum for perception of metre, suggesting the absence 
of any existing metric identity at the beginning to be problematised. Thus, 
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ultimately what we are hearing is a metric problematisation of a tempo 
vector, rather than the other way around. 
 
Fig. 12: imagines me into systems smeared along wires (2011), mm.12-16. 
 
A third means of problematising metric relationships through tempo is to 
simply place sudden tempo shifts on metric shifts. This undermines the 
metric scheme by producing a proportional relationship different from that 
notated, as is occasionally the case in in the honeycombs of memory he built a 
house for the swarm of his thoughts (2011) (Fig. 13). 
The superimposition of the tempo change from 20 to 30 changes the 
proportional relationship between the two metres from the relatively modest 
7:4 to the somewhat more arcane 21:8. While this is not prohibitively difficult 
(the metric modulation is effectively triplets nested inside septuplets), it does 
provide a point of disjuncture (particularly when the tempo relationships are 
slightly less amenable than the 3:2), creating a localised grouping, acting, in 
fact, as a “regular” tempo change. In terms of its capacity to actively 
problematise metric identity, this is a highly localised phenomenon, only 
problematising the immediate metric change. 
	   57	  
 
 
Fig. 13: in the honeycombs of memory he built a house for the swarm of his thoughts 
(2011), pp.36-37. 
 
The actual processes employed to generate tempo material vary from piece to 
piece, and respond to the local exigencies of the metric material. I endeavour, 
for instance, to avoid laying significant tempo change over the top of tightly 
compacted metric changes. The processes follow similar zoning principles to 
those employed to generate interference patterns, and the tempi themselves 
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tend to be built through proportional calculations derived from numerical 
material already present in some strata of already-defined activity. 
Rather than targeting the sorts of interactions described above in any specific 
way, the tempo process is geared towards discovering a way of working that 
will exhibit these particular behaviours without falling into tempo-related 
difficulties, such as getting “stuck” in a feedback loop at an extreme tempo 
Earlier attempts at generating tempo material for in the honeycombs of memory 
he built a house for the swarm of his thoughts (2011), for example, resulted in 
tempo constantly spiralling up or down ad infinitum. This is was an 
unacceptable situation, and the terms of the process needed to be modified 
accordingly. On the other hand, the process finally employed in imagines me 
into systems smeared along wires (2011) resulted in a constantly decreasing 
tempo which, having reached an extreme of slowness (semiquaver=20), 
rapidly increases towards the end of the piece. Despite the seeming absurdity 
of such a tempo, this seemed to result in temporal contexts that would prove 
very interesting to work with. 
2.2.5 Alternate metricities 
Since imagines me into systems smeared along wires (2011), my scores have 
employed a further layer of rhythmic notation, coloured red. This layer 
provides what I think of as an “alternate” temporal flow.   
The red notation brackets off a particular section of the piece, and divides that 
chronometric time (including any changes in tempo, metre, etc) into a number 
of precisely equal units. Because the duration of each pulse is contingent on – 
and framed by – the performed changes in tempo occurring under it, the 
precise duration is not, strictly speaking, exactly calculable, or precisely 
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recuperable. What the red layer notates, effectively, is actually the quality of 
periodicity itself. 
What I was initially trying to access through this notation is the performative 
force required to effectively “place”, with maximum accuracy, two ultimately 
irreconcilable temporal strata; the energy exerted in the attempt to mentally 
and physically produce one plane or vector, while cognitively inhabiting 
another. 
Due to the periodic nature of the stream of pulses, there is the distinct 
possibility of the red layer constituting a meaningful alternative to the 
metricity implied by the notated metre and tempo. 
The fact of its periodicity also makes it a counting alternative in performance. 
That is, it would be possible to treat the red layer as the “true” metre, the 
ground against which the progression of musical time is measured, with the 
black layer treated as a problematising “other” force. 
 
Fig. 14: maps living among the ice of the room (2011), accordion, p.6. 
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The excerpt from maps living among the ice of the room (2011) in Fig. 14, above, 
demonstrates a context in which, based purely on score analysis, the 
perceived metricity is almost impossible to predict.  
In in the honeycombs of memory he built a house for the swarm of his thoughts 
(2011), three different colours (red, blue and green) were used due to the size 
of the ensemble, in order to indicate more clearly to the eye temporal unison 
between instruments. 
2.3.1 Instrumental materials 
I have spent a great deal of time discussing my approach to producing the 
temporal schemata present in my music, in part because they are the first 
things finalised, and in part because those schemata are the elements most 
obviously divergent from whatever might be termed a “common practice” in 
music notation. The elephant in the room is, of course, that this rhythmic 
structure is, at this stage, completely silent. While I will have performed 
extensive work with click-tracks in the development of the temporal scheme, 
the scheme itself implies no such thing. 
What the scheme does do, however, is simultaneously suggest and limit the 
possible direction of energies. It acts as a frame for the distribution of 
instrumental activity. 
These rhythmic structures stand in a two-way dialogue with other material: 
while the articulation of any given interpretation of the temporal structure is 
made possible only through sympathetic mapping of sounding material onto 
that structure; those sounding materials themselves simultaneously can only 
voice themselves within that temporal structure. While, in a strictly 
phenomenological sense, we perceive duration as being a property of the 
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sounding objects, the question of attributing what durational characteristic to 
what material, and the effect this will have on the perception (or not) and 
formation (or not) of objects and relationships in time is foremost in my mind 
while completing all parts of the compositional process that relate to 
(potentially) “sounding” material. 
The process of mapping instrumental events onto the temporal structure 
proceeds in manners very similar to the zoning processes used to determine 
metre. The point of these processes is not to define material per se, but rather 
to define certain types and strengths of relationships and behaviours 
throughout the piece. By framing compositional choice within the borders of 
defined qualities of relationship or behaviour, that choice is subsequently 
narrowed in creatively stimulating ways: “The essential task for any form of 
systemicization is the ordering and rendering fruitful of the internal creative 
mechanism of the composer himself: once pointed in the right direction, he is 
in a position to confront the material with almost total freedom.” 
(Ferneyhough 1995, p.101). 
2.3.2 Categorisation of instrumental resources 
I start compiling lists of possible materials at approximately the same time 
that I am filling in the numerators. At first, these are simply lists of the 
technical means of sound production available to any given instrument. These 
are subsequently refined into categories based firstly on their means of 
production, and secondly on generic qualities of the sounding result. These 
modes of categorisation form the basis for their organisation and distribution 
within the music, with a view to building relationships between different 
impulses. 
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Similarities in sound production produce concordant similarities in the 
resulting sounds themselves, to a greater or lesser extent. 
These forms of similarity are evident in the music of Aaron Cassidy, where 
tenuously audible links result from both the inherent relatedness of sound 
modulations of similar origin, and gesturally similar materials mapped onto 
different physical parameters. Sound is not a disembodied thing, but rather 
the result of an interaction between an instrumental mechanism and the 
performers body. The focus on the human, corporeal aspect of music creation 
is also central for Timothy McCormack, who suggests that the instrument 
only really becomes itself when in the hands of a performer, that the quality of 
being played by an instrumentalist is the essential quality of the instrumental 
mechanism (McCormack 2010). We become aware of the performer’s tongue 
acting on the sound. The various sonic manipulations originating in a bass 
clarinettist’s tongue actions are, no matter how apparently different, 
perceptually linked by the fact that they are produced through various types 
of impact upon the reed. 
It is, however, precisely the tenuousness of these relationships that is of 
interest to me: the ephemeral nature of the frame, the “perhaps-ness” of the 
identities derived from their extreme context-dependence results in a dense 
network of relationships which, depending on myriad factors, may or may 
not be perceived. Regardless of whether or not those relationships are 
perceived or prioritised (either by the performer or the listener), they 
meaningfully frame the final material through the sheer fact of their presence. 
Just as, in negotiating a labyrinth, while not all possible paths will be 
travelled, the shape of any given wall is a result of the invisible paths on the 
other side of it. 
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In the percussion part to imagines me into systems smeared along wires (2011), the 
building of different degrees of relationship based on point of origin can be 
seen through three separate layers of categorisation. The first is the sounding 
instrument itself, which (drawn from a small pool of seven instruments of 
varying timbral qualities) features degrees of similarity ranging from 
identicality, through similarity of sound source (resonant metal, skin, etc) to 
similarity of pitch, to non-similarity. The second is the “beater” (in reality the 
performer’s fingers, the flesh of which is used to sound the instruments, 
further augmented through the use of two types of thimble), with a range of 
similarities based on the degree of difference between any two given beaters. 
The third is the mode of attack, comprising a repertoire of strikes, scrapes, 
mutes, placements, and so forth. These filter through one another, making it 
possible for two consecutive attacks to exhibit a wide range of similarity from 
essential identicality (same instrument, same beater, same attack) through 
extreme un-relatedness (maximally different instrument, maximally different 
beater, maximally different attack). 
When mapped onto the temporal domain, these degrees of relationship 
become further complicated due to the ability of an equidistant series of 
pulses to draw relationships between dissimilar objects. The temporal scheme 
draws relationships between objects through durational similarity, while 
simultaneously sounding objects of greater similarity better reinforce the 
identity of the temporal scheme. 
In Fig. 15, the high degree of similarity between each impulse in the lower 
line of the percussion part (same instrument family (skins), same beater 
(flesh), same attack (strike), same dynamic (ppppp), repeated figuration (high-
low-high-low, also the fact that a variation of this figuration has grounded the 
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percussion part of the preceding section), and the degree of periodicity arising 
from the red layer, combined with the very sparse (minimally intentional) 
texture against which it is set, produce a context in which this takes an 
extremely foregrounded perceptual role in relation to its surroundings.  
 
Fig. 15: imagines me into systems smeared along wires (2011), m.76 
 
The high degree of similarity between these four elements produces an 
extremely strong connection between the four impulses, despite that they 
cross the red/black divide, framing them in a (comparatively) gestural, 
almost motivic way. As mentioned above, the only way in which the temporal 
structure is actually perceivable is through its elaboration and articulation in 
sounding figures such as this. Such gestural figures, not restricting themselves 
to simply explicating a single temporal stream, significantly undermine the 
temporal identity. Regardless of the coherence of any temporal system lying 
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behind the piece’s surface, we engage with that surface perceptually as a 
notionally neutral plane, informed by the ways in which the piece itself 
frames that plane, and by our own experiences of ecological (including 
musical) attunement. In a context as gesturally ambiguous as these recent 
pieces, we gravitate towards the points of strongest relationship. It is the 
relative strengths of similarity, more than anything else, that dictate the 
perceived hierarchies of temporal material.  
The second means through which relationships are drawn between materials 
is similarity of effect. While the process posits a possible link between two 
elements produced through the same means (such as subtone and 
fluttertongue), it also posits a possible link between two elements produced 
differently, but similar in sound or effect (such as fluttertongue and a throat 
growl). 
This has been a feature of all recent works, but was used most systematically 
in the case of maps living among the ice of the room (2011), where the non-
transferability of ways of organising means of production between the alto 
flute and the accordion became unproductively restrictive of the sorts of 
canonic or heterophonic strategies that could be employed. 
The materials were organised by their resemblance to the behavioural 
archetypes outlined in Fig. 16. 
These in no way imply specific means of production, or even specific 
hierarchies between them (although I regard the ornament as being 
intrinsically and necessarily modulatory in order to retain its function). 
Depressing a key on the alto flute might be ornamental, it might be a point 
when depressed and immediately released, it might be a “flutter” when 
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trilled, it might be transitional when gradually depressed or released, and it 
might be sustained when depressed (thus changing the pitch) and held. 
Similarly, a “transition” material might be realised through gradual changes 
in fingering, breath pressure, flute angle, sung pitch, breathiness of tone, etc.  
1. Sustained A sustained element, modulating or framing all 
simultaneous material, but static in its own right. 
2. Transitional A gradual directional shift from one state to another. 
3. “Flutter” A rapidly shifting/rearticulating/alternating state. 
4. Point A single, localised zone of effect. No envelope. 
Modulatory or framing in identity. 
5. Ornament A single, localised ornamental element. Locally 
modulatory in identity. 
 
Fig. 16: “gestural” types in maps living among the ice of the room (2011) 
 
2.4 Formal characteristics 
It will be apparent from the foregoing re-creation of the compositional process 
that there has been no specific energy devoted to defining form. Rather than 
conforming to a pre-defined structure, the formal characteristics emanate 
from musical behaviours over time; they are an almost accidental, almost 
coincidental result of the enactment of compositional process, rather than 
being a defining frame through which that process is understood. 
It may seem odd then, to observe that since imagines me into systems smeared 
along wires (2011), my works have been divided into a series of very short 
“movements” or sections. In the case of maps living among the ice of the room 
(2011) silences are replaced by extended fermatas over actions whose length is 
defined by the physical properties of the performer or their instrument (such 
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as a pause held for as long as it takes the accordion bellows to open under 
their own weight while playing a top C#). 
These section breaks are arbitrarily inserted at the very end of the process of 
composition at points that seemed structurally important during the process 
of folding that led to the numerator series, but given all subsequent stages of 
composition, these have no functional significance whatsoever. The nature of 
the composition process means that the piece has essentially been composed 
as if the breaks weren’t there. Sounding material is notated as if it continues 
directly across these breaks. There is no discontinuity in the musical materials 
as such. 
This is a case of the frame implied by the section breaks (a point of repose, an 
ending) being incongruent with every other sign. In my opinion, the silent 
section break is a frame of sufficient strength to retain its implied function as a 
delineator of the form of the piece (particularly in the total absence of 
anything else), while conversely this form is steadfastly ignored by all other 
framing mechanisms present in the piece. 
Through the enactment of a series of processes, each performed in response to 
the “frame” of the piece as it stands at that point in the process, the piece 
gradually evolves into a highly morphologically ambiguous sedimentation of 
process and information. The resulting score, the trace, is an archaeology of its 
own history, simultaneously revealing and obscuring its own origins. The 
multi-layered approach results in a series of conflicting frames, conflicting 
intentionalities. 
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3. PERFORMER AS PERCEIVER 
As mentioned previously, the score is conceived of as the resultant trace left 
by the act of composition. The compositional process leads to, and ends with 
the production of the score. The purpose of the score as a communicative 
document is to relay a fixed archaeology of the months-long process that has 
led to its creation, from which a performance might be constructed (one might 
say “composed”). As such, no attempt is made to reconcile the various 
conflicting, overlaid forces, or to code an “interpretation” into the score. The 
score is, itself, a document requiring interpretation and processing: a 
document to be perceived, in the sense established earlier. Indeed, as for Evan 
Johnson (2011), the score is a document evincing “the rejection of the ideal of 
transparency – that is, of the direct responsibility of the score to the listener 
and its potential recuperability”. 
3.1 Temporality of learning 
Faced with such wilful non-communication, the first step for the performer is 
to find a way into the notation. The sheer volume of non-commensurate 
temporal data, as well as decoupled physical parameters, requires that the 
score be treated in layers of information, learned one at a time. Brian 
Ferneyhough observes in “Unity capsule: An instant diary” that “the order in 
which each individual approaches this task influences the final result 
enormously, in spite of the fact that all interpreters are learning ‘the same 
piece’” (Ferneyhough 1995, p.100). For me, the most interesting aspect of this 
comment is the profound effect of the temporality of learning. Ferneyhough’s 
attribution of variance in performance, at least in part, to the order in which 
the layers of the piece were learned reflects the modulation of earlier-learned 
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material by later-learned material. To put it another way, the order of the 
successive framing of score information affects its outcome. The precise shape 
of the frame at an earlier stage in learning the piece shapes all future 
interpretive decisions. In this sense, the experience of decoding, processing 
and internalising a performance from the trace (the score) is precisely 
analogous to the gradual sedimentation of information over multiple steps in 
the compositional process that generates that trace. 
The nature of the “interpretive decision” itself should be briefly explored. I 
understand the act of performance to be the result of an almost infinite 
number of nested and superimposed choices. The term “decision” or “choice” 
implies a certain consciousness on the part of the decider or chooser, but I 
don’t think this is necessarily the case. Rather, even the decisions we make 
unconsciously are based on our accumulated experience, in the performer’s 
case including the collection of personal characteristics that might loosely be 
termed “musicianship”, as well as the sum of their experience of learning 
music, dating back to formative instrumental lessons, combining in what 
might be termed a sort of “ecology of performance”. This points back to the 
earlier observation of the centrality of experience of the act of reading in 
relation to the Codex Seraphinianus. Similarly, the performer’s experience of 
the act of performance and, perhaps even more pertinently, the process of 
learning music, are central to the relationship between interpreter and score. 
In the case of the Ferneyhough example above, the selection of the order of 
layers in Unity capsule (1976) may be a highly considered, conscious choice, or 
it may be quite unconscious. In a lecture-workshop devoted to Timothy 
McCormack’s Mirror stratum for contrabass clarinet and cello (2011), Richard 
Haynes of the ELISION ensemble demonstrated his approach to learning the 
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contrabass clarinet part by playing a single gesture repeatedly, starting from 
the “first” layer, and each time adding a subsequent layer in the order in 
which it was added during the learning process (Universität der Künste, 
Berlin. 24 October 2011). The first layer comprised almost exclusively the 
notated pitch materials (or, perhaps more accurately in the case of 
McCormack’s music, fingered materials). This seemed to be a fairly intuitively 
made decision – as if it were the obvious place to start – but it is, in fact, one 
reinforced by instrumental pedagogy that prioritises pitch and rhythmic 
information. As highly improbable as it would be, it is possible to imagine 
having decided to start with embouchure deviations, followed by articulation 
markings, and so on, until – finally – the fingerings are added last. This would 
radically change the nature of the performer’s own growing understanding of 
what the sound of the piece actually is. 
The temporality of the learning process has in some ways been the most 
gratifying aspect of working with performers. Generally speaking, my work is 
done in collaboration with highly competent, sympathetic performers who 
really enjoy this sort of process. I have seen my role in this sort of relationship 
as being largely a permission-giving one, being reassuring while the 
performer is making their way through their own process of “discovering” 
the sound of the piece. On the other hand, given the ubiquity of short 
rehearsal periods, and oftentimes the difficulty of meeting with performers 
far in advance of the performance, this collaborative process is frequently 
directed towards fixing a performance, curtailing the extent to which this can 
be a genuine process of experimentation and discovery. Consideration for this 
is something I aim to build into project timelines of future collaborations, 
where at all possible. 
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A prime example of this imposition on the process is my provision of click-
tracks to assist with the rapid learning of the metric proportions within the 
music. In the case of imagines me into systems smeared along wires (2011), the 
performance itself was undertaken with assistance from a click-track 
(although the performers – Richard Haynes and Peter Neville – commented in 
advance of the premiere performance that this had turned out to be an 
unnecessary, and unnecessarily detrimental, choice). While this assists with 
rapid uptake, it also fixes temporal hierarchies in an undesirable way. The 
notation seeks to produce, as much as anything, the cognitive dissonance 
between multiple temporal layers, which is simply impossible when one of 
those layers is “given” by an external source. 
It would be preferable for the learning process to require a series of decisions, 
conscious or unconscious, based on myriad considerations including (but not 
limited to) the perceived significance of the material attached to each given 
rhythmic stratum, the physical “presence” of the sorts of materials attached to 
each given rhythmic layer (i.e. the degree to which the definition of the 
physical actions is possible to use as a ground from which to build the rest of 
the material), and the relative ease of placement of each of the remaining 
layers against each given layer. In other words, the use of a click-track beyond 
the early stages of learning and rehearsal actively bars, by fixing temporal 
identity, the perceptual agency the notation is designed to access. 
3.2 Notational clarity, interpretive ambiguity 
The vast majority of my notational decisions are made in order to preserve 
just such sorts of ambiguity, while retaining the requisite clarity of the 
physical gestures to be employed. The precise choreographic “material”, as 
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such, is supplied unambiguously, but the results will vary significantly 
depending on the way the interactions between these elements are 
interpreted. This strategy of nomenclatural clarity combined with a refusal to 
notate what I regard to be interpretive decisions makes the precise realisation 
of any given notational constellation somewhat ambiguous, ranging from the 
relatively small-scale ambiguity of relative weighting of notated elements, 
through to the far more substantial ambiguity of precise physical 
comportment indicated by such a combination. Thus the ambiguity is one that 
arises from the lack of definition produced by the inter-referential nature of 
notated signs, the lack of significatory redundancy, rather than wilful lack of 
clarity. 
 
Fig. 17: imagines me into systems smeared along wires mm.112-115, bass clarinet. 
 
In the excerpt from the bass clarinet part of imagines me into systems smeared 
along wires (2011) in Fig. 17, for instance, every single element on the page 
indicates a specific sonic or choreographic outcome (or, in the case of 
ornamental markings, a limited field of possible outcomes). But on even 
cursory examination their combination becomes problematic. The second half 
of the 2/14 bar into the 1/16 bar, for instance, features a fingered pitch, over 
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which is superimposed both a throat growl and a flutter-tongue, coupled with 
some extremely substantial embouchure distortions. In the 1/16 bar, the 
throat growl is replaced by a sung pitch. The prima facie assignation of any one 
of these notated elements as “primary” material is extremely difficult, as it is 
unclear to what degree any of these notated elements is intended to be 
“heard” in the way it is notated. Ultimately, the sounding result will be some 
balance of mutually destabilising choreographic elements, with relative 
importance and stability informed by a combination of conscious interpretive 
choice, individual physical and technical predisposition, and the order in 
which layers were added throughout the learning process. 
The discussion thus far has emphasised the notational ambiguity targeted by 
my practice, which I understand to engage directly with notions of performer 
agency. This partially connects with a broader conversation in terms of any 
approach to notational practice; that is, the degree to which the notation 
denotes a specific, transmitted and transmissible sounding result or, 
conversely, is purely a designation of a choreography with indeterminate 
results. In reality, my notational practice embodies qualities of both. On the 
one hand, the notation and compositional process itself appear fixated with 
choreography as a means of drawing perceptually and interpretatively 
meaningful musical relationships (parameters are typically, although not 
exclusively, defined by different physical interactions between performer and 
instrument, while ornamentation invariably references its mechanical means 
of production, rather than its sounding result). On the other hand, while the 
sonic outcome my notational practice is certainly indeterminate, this 
indeterminacy in fact takes place within a relatively circumscribed aural 
space. Typically, the morphology of the sound is far more controlled and 
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predictable than would be expected from a music taking sonic indeterminacy 
as its primary aim. 
This stems from an explicit – and increasing – focus on morphological 
indeterminacy arising from interpretive decision (or, at the very least, the 
filtering of the notation through the intellect and physicality of an individual 
performer), rather than on the sonic unpredictability arising from the 
confluence of materials understood to be primarily choreographic. 
The possibility of locating such ambiguity in interpretive choice, however, is 
predicated upon notational elements having some kind of signification beyond 
simply their choreographic realisation. To this end, despite a sound world 
distinctly removed from that implied by traditional notation, my work is 
increasingly engaging with the historicity of notational symbology itself, 
reflecting a nomenclatural world in which symbols with an (albeit subjective 
and qualitative) aura of historical signification are displaced and subverted to 
new ends.  
3.3 Notational historicity 
While on a certain level the purely modulatory function of these notational 
elements ends up reducing their indications to their choreographic, rather 
than sounding, implications, the systems of nomenclature are selected 
precisely because of their connection with performance history, their 
possession of a qualitative implication beyond simply that of their 
choreography.  
This is perhaps most easily illustrated with reference to pitch. In Fig. 18, 
featuring the woodwind and brass lines from section 8 of in the honeycombs of 
memory he built a house from the swarm of his thoughts (2011), despite the notated 
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pitch being constantly destabilised by a multitude of embouchure and 
fingering deviations in all instruments, the fact of pitch’s historical primacy 
will suggest, for most players, that those embouchure and fingering 
deviations are deviations of the notated pitch. The notated pitch provides a 
point of stability from which to build up the remaining layers. 
The case is similar, although much more ambiguous, with more directly 
historically allusive notations such as ornaments. There is a vast array of 
possible significations attached to the notion of the ornament, and I wouldn’t 
presume to speak on behalf of performers engaging with such a notation, but 
it’s reasonable to suggest that the very fact that it is clearly ornamental implies 
a certain hierarchical relationship with other notated materials. The fact that 
the coloured temporal strata are voiced exclusively by ornaments potentially 
implies a hierarchical relationship between temporal layers in which the black 
is dominant, merely decorated by the coloured strata. On the other hand, if 
one interprets the ornament to be a maximally distortive superimposition 
with a localised zone of impact, then the implied hierarchy is potentially 
reversed. 
There is clearly no composer-mandated manner in which interpreters should 
negotiate the historicity of notation in these works – the potential hierarchical 
implications produced by collisions of notational devices with different 
degrees of historicity will mean different things to different performers. 
Historicity simply shapes the field of possible engagement with notation 
through its combination of familiar and unfamiliar signs, while also providing 
one more strand of possible information that can be drawn on. 
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Fig. 18: in the honeycombs of memory he built a house for the swarm of his thoughts 
(2011), oboe, bass clarinet, horn, trumpet and trombone, p.8. 
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3.4 Temporal layering 
There are several passages in in the honeycombs of memory he built a house for the 
swarm of his thoughts where information for a single performer is stratified 
across four different incommensurate temporal strata, controlling a number of 
different choreographic or sounding parameters. In a very real sense, a 
precise replication of the notated music is unrealisable, not because of its 
physical impossibility, but because of the inability of human cognition, on the 
whole, to reconcile this number of layers of conflicting information. To 
approach such a passage (for example, the viola or bass clarinet solos towards 
the centre of the piece, or the oboe solo that concludes it) the performer must, 
though either experimentation or analytical interrogation (or a combination of 
both) arrive at something they regard as a meaningful hierarchy of events. 
This is perhaps most necessary in the case of the approach to time. I take it as 
a given that a performer will be working with only one internal clock 
(although I suppose hypothetically there may be individuals for whom this 
general psychological limitation does not apply, or who can find ways around 
it). As such, given the superimposition of four different clocks, it is necessary 
to make a decision as to which clock is going to be “counted”, and which act 
as a superimposition. 
The constitution of the score itself as a document of uncertain intentionality – 
a series of incongruent, non-redundant frames – produces a performance 
context that is heavily reliant on perceptual agency at both conscious and 
unconscious levels in order to construct a performance. 
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4. THE PORTFOLIO PIECES 
The outlining of any single, unifying aesthetic position uniting the four pieces 
discussed in this thesis, composed over a period of two years, is at best a 
convenient (if necessary) fiction. In reality, the thesis represents a kind of 
taking-stock of the present state, at a single point in time, of an aesthetic 
position that is in reality an ongoing process of exploration. While the 
preceding discussion presents an accurate account of my philosophical and 
technical preoccupations at the time of writing, this is not a set of 
preoccupations that has remained fixed. Rather, it has simultaneously 
informed and been informed by the act of composition itself. 
This short chapter provides a brief description of each of the works included 
in the portfolio of compositions. This is not a collection of programme notes, 
or a composition diary, but rather aims to trace the formation and 
development of those elements that have become central to the musical 
thought outlined in this thesis. This is also a significantly more “reflective” 
discussion than the preceding chapters, having to do necessarily with the 
recollection of subjective compositional priority and shifting aesthetic intent, 
rather than concrete statements. 
4.1 schattenzeichen (2010) 
Completed in August 2010, schattenzeichen marked a significant break from 
previous pieces of mine primarily in terms of the extreme degree of 
parametric decoupling employed at both compositional and performative 
levels. It also marked the first time I had employed an extended metric 
vocabulary in any of my work. 
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The compositional process itself was built around a vocabulary of parameters 
including more traditionally “musical” parameters such as dynamic, range 
and pitch, as well as physical parameters such as embouchure shape, finger 
pressure, bow pressure, etc. These parameters were required to voice a small 
selection of intentionally banal, “archetypal” materials (silence, sustained 
sound, trill, glissando, scale, etc) which could be fluidly interpreted in terms 
of their precise musical/notational realisation. Each of these interactions 
between parameter and material, and their rates of change, were composed 
separately, as if it were a single piece for large ensemble (there were twenty-
eight different parameters in total) which was then condensed onto the two 
instruments of the duo. 
The purpose of working this way compositionally was never to dictate 
material per se, but rather to paint me into a series of difficult compositional 
situations that I would then need to respond creatively to, in a hopefully 
original manner. Each confluence of parameter and material describes, in 
essence, a challenge to be surmounted, rather than a prescription of a given 
result. 
In retrospect, the manner in which fixing notes on the page represents a 
response to a given context is a fairly clear precursor of what I have come to 
explicitly think of as framing. 
At the performative and sonic level, such an approach resulted in a 
significantly increased access to what at the time I thought of as “transitional” 
acoustic spaces, such as the sonic degradation of the viola tone as the finger 
pressure changes, for example. The appeal of such a sonic vocabulary was 
twofold: firstly the attractive complexity of the sound itself; and secondly its 
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ambiguity of function. In other words, schattenzeichen consistently poses the 
question as to the point at which a choreographic instruction (a change in bow 
pressure, for instance) takes on such perceptual presence that it supplants the 
notional dominance of (intentionally unimposing) more traditional materials 
(e.g. pitch). 
schattenzeichen’s employment of extended metric vocabularies is similar to the 
approach taken by Brian Ferneyhough in pieces such as Superscriptio (1981), in 
that the bar is understood essentially as a container (of varying size) for the 
comportment of energies unrelated to underlying pulse. This renders metre 
ultimately a descriptor of chronometric time, in stark contrast to the manner 
in which this thesis describes my treatment of metre. It was, however, during 
the process of composing this, and learning to count such metric changes, that 
I first became interested in the qualities of potential metric interference 
discussed earlier in Chapter Two. 
The pitch material in schattenzeichen is regarded as a ground, as a basis for 
distortion, yet this very quality implies an understanding that pitch is 
inherently valid material in its own right. This pitch philosophy is, if 
anything, the vestigial remains of previous ways of working, and was to be 
systematically (if gradually) undermined and eradicated in subsequent pieces. 
At this point, however, relationships and correlations are drawn in the 
domain of pitch between the instruments and, while events such as scales and 
glissandi are conceived of as concrete objects in their right, they are 
understood to serve primarily through as a means of articulating pitch (or, at 
the very least, find their articulation with reference to definite pitch). More 
succinctly: schattenzeichen regards of pitch to have a kind of meaningful a 
priori identity separate from its realisation in sound. 
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4.2 imagines me into systems smeared along wires (2011) 
Completed in January 2011, imagines me into systems smeared along wires was a 
direct result, in many respects, of avenues opened up through schattenzeichen. 
The most readily apparent from its notational innovations are its investment 
in temporality and ornament. 
The developments in temporal practice stemmed from the metric experiments 
conducted in schattenzeichen. Initially, this originated in a sense that, if one 
were to use such an extended metric palette (which, at least as a notational 
conceit, inescapably deals with the concept of pulse), this implied, rightly or 
wrongly, a certain obligation to the notion of pulse as an element in its own 
right – that it not be a neutral division of chronometric time, but rather be 
permitted the possibility of “speaking”, itself; that it be able to constitute a 
primary and (at least potentially) audible part of the music’s fabric. The 
complex rhythms of a piece such as schtattenzeichen, on the other hand, 
actively obscure any independent interest that might be present in the metric 
structure. In order to better explore and develop this aspect of my music, I 
needed to “get out of the metre’s way”. 
To satisfy this vaguely sensed obligation to vivify the pulse-world of my 
music, I took the apparently extreme step of eliminating all extraneous 
rhythmic detail, leaving a skeleton constructed only of pulse. Where previous 
pieces had been tangled networks of tuplets built upon a relatively neutral 
pulse and tempo framework, in imagines me into systems smeared along wires the 
entire temporal life of the piece is subsumed within that framework itself.  
imagines me into systems smeared along wires also marks my first experiments 
with extremes of tempo. These were undertaken with a view to negotiating 
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and crossing the line between the perception of something as “pulse” 
(conceived of as a single fabric having a density, or perhaps rather a 
“viscosity”) and the perception of discrete “events”.  
One of the ways in which I “got out of metre’s way” in this piece is evident 
from the manner in which pitch is deployed: nearly every single metric pulse 
in the entire piece activates a new pitch in the bass clarinet part. The pitch 
material itself is drawn from a single, essentially unmodified, harmonic series 
(although this is somewhat obscured by its tempering to quarter-tones and 
smaller inflections, as well as the fact that most of the pitch material is so high 
in the spectrum that its identity as a spectrum is itself rarely overt). Pitch is, in 
imagines me into systems smeared along wires, understood as a basis for 
distortion and elaboration, but is still privileged in terms of identity compared 
to other elements. Pitch is regarded as having a stronger “perception-
drawing” weight than other parameters, and is still treated as having identity 
in its own right (i.e. a dot on the five-line staff denotes an actual pitch, rather 
than simply a fingering). It is not until the very last page that pitch material is 
realistically supplanted by embouchure material in the bass clarinet part. 
On the other hand, however, architectural relationships across the span of the 
piece are shifted away from the domain of pitch, and towards parametric 
similarity. Relationships are drawn between similarity of production-means, 
and similarity of effect, but very rarely is pitch employed as an 
unproblematised means of drawing reference between different points. 
imagines me into systems smeared along wires also marks the first time that 
ornamentation appears extensively in any piece of mine. Certainly it was the 
first time that I had delegated any significant executive choice to the 
	   83	  
performer (certain types of indeterminacy have been present in my work 
since approximately 2003, but what the performer is actually expected to do 
had always been clearly defined). In addition to the implied problematisation 
of hierarchies and text/ornament relationships (discussed previously in this 
thesis), this was intended to shift the signification of the notation away from 
the intentionality implied by concrete musical materials, and towards a 
(tentatively and conditionally expressed) descriptor of a quality and zone of 
impact. This shift reflects my gradually changing understanding of my 
musical “materials” from a collision of relatively well-defined objects (i.e. 
notionally intentional elements that admit of a single identity, which they 
themselves describe) to a collision of potently ill-defined forces (i.e. non-
intentional elements that contribute to the postulation, in the act of 
performance, of a highly provisional, highly unstable state from which an 
identity might be inferred). 
Another immediately and visually obvious innovation in this work is the 
introduction of coloured temporal notation. This seemed a perfectly natural 
response to the circumstances of a temporal topology built entirely on pulse 
(in other words, the proposition of multiple, simultaneous layers of pulse was 
a very small logical step from the original premise). The implications of such 
an approach to pulse (particularly in terms of aspects of perception and 
hierarchy) remain central to my ongoing compositional work, and the pieces 
subsequent to imagines me into systems smeared along wires show a continued 
tinkering and experimentation with the results of varying approaches to this 
material. 
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4.3 in the honeycombs of memory he built a house for the swarm of his 
thoughts (2011) 
in the honeycombs of memory he built a house for the swarm of his thoughts, 
completed in July 2011, is perhaps best understood as stemming from the 
challenges of mapping the preoccupations of imagines me into systems smeared 
along wires onto a larger, conducted ensemble. The compositional process 
itself was, in fact, extremely similar. 
My experience of the rehearsal process for imagines me into systems smeared 
along wires had taught me that, in terms of achieving the desired activation of 
performer agency in the face of multiple temporal layers, an externally 
provided beat (such as one originating from an in-performance click-track, or, 
in the case of honeycombs, a conductor) is extremely counter-productive, in 
that it effectively removes agency in favour of passive response. The solution 
to this particular problem was to delegate some of the “conducting” 
responsibility to the players themselves. Each coloured layer has, at any given 
time, a “leader”, who is to be followed by all other players with material in 
that colour. In principle, the difficulty of essentially following two conductors 
at once, in addition to the shifting patterns and weight of unison attack 
throughout the ensemble, should offer sufficient basis for the requisite tension 
between these multiple layers, resulting in the need to individually prioritise 
and synthesise them. 
Another difference is in the sheer volume of temporal information itself (four 
temporal strata, mapped across eight instruments). This was, essentially, 
intended to be quite literally audibly indecipherable, with audited temporal 
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morphology becoming an unpredictable by-product of those shifting patterns 
of correlation and unison.  
in the honeycombs of memory he built a house for the swarm of his thoughts also 
offers a significant shift in thinking about pitch when compared with imagines 
me into systems smeared along wires. Pitch is composed in canonic structures, 
and the pitch vocabulary is drawn from the harmonic series in precisely the 
same way as in imagines me. However, the composed “pitches” are rarely 
permitted to exist without some form of radical distortion applied, which is 
clearly visible through the preponderance of graphically-indicated squawks 
and sweeps in all of the wind and brass parts. Where the notated pitch is left 
without being interfered with (particularly sections 13 and 22), this is 
conceived of as a notable feature in its own right: a kind of clearing of 
distortive and contradictory information, leaving only the pitch domain, is 
conceived of as a “flattening” – a translation of all musical information into a 
single dimension. These “flattenings” could hypothetically have taken place 
onto a parameter other than pitch. Indeed, analogous “flattenings” occur in 
other places throughout the piece, such as the flattening onto single 
instruments in sections 14 and 15, the former also completely erasing the 
domain of pitch in favour of an extraordinarily slow glissando at a bow speed 
unlikely to reliably produce definite pitch at all. 
4.4 maps living among the ice of the room (2011) 
Composed in September 2011, maps living among the ice of the room represents, 
in many respects, a clarification and enhancement of the concerns of the 
previous two pieces, forming the third part in what I informally regard as a 
sort of developmental trilogy.  
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The primary advances are the total foreswearing of pitch as a valid 
organisational domain at all, and the introduction of elements dependant on 
the physical characteristics of the performers for their duration. There is also 
no unanimous temporal scale; rather, the players are always playing 
independently, with only certain starting points for events synchronised – 
thus the players are constantly mutually-dependant, while never actually 
playing “together”. 
The way pitch is dealt with in maps living among the ice of the room varies 
between the two instruments. In the case of the flute, pitches were selected 
primarily for their fingering properties, both in terms of tube length and the 
sorts of finger trills that would be available. The trills themselves were 
selected for their comparative volume and resonance, or the degree to which 
they would destabilise any sounding pitch that may be present. Indeed, the 
flute part contains very few “standard” pitched notes that actually sound, but 
rather comprises a vocabulary of breath and half-sounds. The “pitch” 
structure itself makes frequent use of repetition, but pitch has become so 
ephemeral as to make their description as pitch relationships almost 
meaningless. Rather, these relationships are correlations of tube length, with 
the corresponding audibly linkable relationships in timbre. Furthermore, any 
given “pitch” identity tends to be held for such a length of time that it’s ability 
to behave in a motivic or harmonic way is severely hindered. 
The accordion part, on the other hand, cannot escape definite pitch. Pitch is 
rather rendered meaningless through an attempt at over-definition. Pitches 
remain static for an often uncomfortably long time, losing their weight as a 
shifting, shiftable “material” that could be discursively functional. It redirects 
attention towards the multitude of finger and bellows manipulations being 
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superimposed on those pitches. “Chords” appear in the accordion part 
(something largely foreign to my work). Such harmonic identities, in other 
music typically meaningful or functional in some way, are here removed from 
such a meaning-giving context. They become strange, out-of-place and 
isolated in an expressive world constructed from the physicality of breath. 
The insights into my practice and priorities expressed in this thesis are, in 
essence, a statement of where things stand following the composition of maps 
living among the ice of the room. No doubt things will continue to develop, in 
ways that will be partially explored in the Conclusion.
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CONCLUSION 
The foregoing has been a discussion of attitudes of compositional and musical 
practice that are still in the process of taking shape. In this sense, my own 
compositional development is itself an ongoing process of listening and 
responding to my own work, and the work of others. The act of composing a 
piece is not an attempt to “solve” the constellation of questions and 
preoccupations discussed in this thesis, but rather to find new ways of 
engaging with and exploring those issues. 
The major new development in the compositional processes developed in this 
series of pieces is the approach to temporal structuring, and its interaction 
with the available instrumental materials. 
I think the outcomes of the pieces employing these processes are highly 
promising, although it is too soon to assess the broader success of these 
strategies. Such reflection will need to wait until a greater number of 
performances, by different performers, has taken place. 
There are a number of avenues for future exploration, such as the ordering of 
the compositional process itself. Just as the order in which a performer learns 
layers of score information has a substantial effect on the sounding result, so 
the order in which compositional processes are layered affects the final shape 
of the gradually narrowing frame.  
Since the beginning of 2012, I have been composing a number of text-based 
scores, typically of open instrumentation and duration. These began as 
experiments purely for research purposes, to better understand certain 
aspects of the way we perceive form in the case of pieces in which a specific 
architecture is not defined. There have been a number of aspects, however, 
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that would profitably translate into my more fully-notated works. Particularly 
appealing is the notion that the composition of a given parameter might 
reflect similar processes to those of constructing a performance of such scores. 
In terms of these text scores themselves, I intend to continue exploring such 
alternative approaches to notation, which will potentially broaden both the 
palette of my music itself, and the social and performance contexts in which it 
is heard. 
A focus for the immediate future is on works with a significantly increased 
sparseness and duration. By radically increasing the distance between things, 
I hope to substantially undermine their fixity which, given the explicit focus 
on performer and listener agency in the face of increasing levels of ambiguity, 
offers one avenue of progression. This will manifest most obviously in a large-
scale (60+ minutes) work for ensemble, comprising smaller interlocking 
component works, entitled WALD (after the Gerhard Richter book of forestry 
photography); and in a series of one-page “microscores” for solo instrument 
intended to be played (truly) as slow as possible, to the point of 
fundamentally shifting any possible meaning that rhythmic notation can have 
(the first, currently in progress, is titled der schatten eines vogels zog über dein 
gesicht and comprises a single system on a single page for violin with an 
intended duration of between 5 and 30 minutes).  
There is also potential for development in the utilisation of the temporal 
scheme itself. As alluded to in the body of the thesis, the use of time signature 
to affect proportional change in pulse width has, depending on viewpoint, 
either the virtue or the limitation of restricting the proportional vocabulary 
available. Similarly, its grounding in traditional metric notations adds to those 
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proportional identities a patina of either resonant historicism or needless 
obscurantism. There is certainly scope to re-imagine the notational and 
compositional strategies employed for this purpose to more directly express 
the bare concepts embodied therein. 
One element that, to my mind, requires reconsideration and development is 
the approach to large-scale form. While, on a medium-ground level, the 
formal structure do seem to result from local context-based relationships, the 
fact that there is so much leeway in terms of compositional choice has allowed 
a relatively uninterrogated Romanticism to creep into the large-scale forms of 
the pieces – the endings in particular. The comparatively polite 
conventionality of these endings, while in certain respects quite exhilarating, 
unfortunately frame the preceding piece in a manner which, to my mind, 
uncomfortably situates it as a “normal” piece of music. It effectively solves the 
problem of identity (or, at least, does so slightly too much). I need to develop 
means of having large-scale architecture better reflect (or emanate from) the 
local weirdnesses of the music. In part, this is what I am hoping that WALD 
and the microscores will achieve.   
In general, these priorities for future directions reflect, on the one hand, an 
increasing engagement with the “experimental” (in the loosest possible sense) 
aspects of my work, and on the other hand, the stripping away of 
accumulated baggage in order to get to the heart of what is interesting to me 
in this regard. 
What has been successful in my work over the last two years, however, is the 
engineering of attitudes to compositional process that reflect my own 
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preferences and engagement with the world: a constant questioning, and a 
constant listening. 
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NOTES 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i “Unser Blickfeld ist zu weit, um zu sehen. Unser Leben ist zu viel, um es 
wahrnehmen. Sehen und Erkenntnis kommt nur aus der Einengung, 
Eingrenzung. … Wir erkennen etwas, sobald wir den Ausschnitt fokussieren, 
einengen, ein Detail beobachten, und Detail heißt, einen Rahmen setzen. 
Rahmen kann eine Denkweise, eine Methode, ein Kriterium – irgendeine Art 
von Filter sein.” 
ii In dem Moment, in dem unsere Aktivität in die Prozesse eingreift, 
verändern wir jene und verfälschen sie damit. …“Last die Klänge sie selbst 
sein” soll aber nicht al seine Abwendung vom Hören gedeutet werden (Lasst 
die Klänge für sich), sondern im Gegenteil der nichtabgestumpften, 
aufmersamen Passivität den Weg bahnen (Hört den Klängen beim Sie- selbst- 
Sein zu). 
iii “…die vielleicht wesentlichsten – oder mir kostbarsten – Aspekte von Kunst 
funktionieren nicht nach dem Sender-Empfänger-Modell von Botschaften. 
Höchstens vielleicht, wenn wir die Kausalkette umkehren – was natürlich 
streng verboten ist! – und den  Künstler zum Empfänger, den 
Wahrnehmenden aber zum Sender machen. Höchstens also, wenn der 
Empfang, die Empfänglichkeit, die Fähigkeit, sich selbst zur Membran zu 
machen und in Schwingung zu geraten, die eigentliche Botschaft ist. Wenn 
die Botschaft keine weitergegebene Information (Festlegung, Faktum), 
sondern die Infragestellung des Faktischen und die Aufweichung des 
Gefestigten ist. Wenn also vom Künstler nichts weitergegeben wird (keine 
Daten), sondern im Rezipienten eher etwas wie ein neuer/unentdeckter Sinn 
sich öffnet (etwas, das selbst Daten produziert – so, als würde er eine für den 
Wahrnehmenden neue Software anwenden), und dies Öffnung Platz schafft 
für Empfindungen (Sinnesdaten), die dann schon viel eher, als das Kunstwerk 
selbst, die Gestalt einer Information, einer Sendung, annehmen können.” 
iv Information IST Redundanz: “Die Tautologie sagt laut Wittgenstein nichts 
aus über die Welt und halt keinerlei Beziehung zu ihr (Tractatus). Ich glaube 
dagegen, daß die Tautologie das Grundprinzip von Sprache überhaupt ist. 
Beziehungsweise das Grundprinzip der Beziehung von Sprache und Welt. 
Jede Beschreibung, Erklärung, Analyse, Definition ist genau in der analogen 
Weise Verdopplung, Wiederholung, Redundanz wie das die Tautologie auch 
ist. Etwas entsprechendes gilt auch für “Information”. Es ist nicht so, daß 
Information das ist, was sich vom Redundanten abhebt. Es ist vielmehr 
umgekehrt, daß Information ohne Redundanz gar nicht möglich ist. 
Redundanz hat etwas zu tun mit “Rahmen”; etwas wiederholen heißt, es 
näher zu fassen kriegen, es fixieren, ausschneiden aus seiner Umgebung, es 
rahmen. Auch für “Bedeutung” gilt das Gleiche: Bedeutung und 
Verdopplung oder Unterstreichung, Hervorhebung sind ohnehin fast 
synonym. 
Bedeutung, Information, Begreifen sind alles redundanz-abhängige 
Transformationen dessen, was ist. Aber das was ist, ist das Unbedeutende, 
Nicht-Informative, Unbegriffene: die Welt, so wie sie uns umgibt und wir in 
ihr sind.” 
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